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FOREWORD 
This study has been conducted and prepared under the 
direction of James W. Martin, project director for the 
University of Kentucky. The research was financed by a 
grant made by the Small Business Administration, United 
States Government, under the authority of Public Law 699 
(85th Congress). 
Only a limited number of copies of this report have been 
printed. It is available for reference in any of the Small 
Business Administration offices throughout the United States 
or at many reference libraries. Copies of the report also may 
be purchased directly from the University of Kentucky Press, 
Lexington, Kentucky. 
Summaries of this study are being printed and will be 
available in reasonable quantities. These summaries may be 
secured from SBA field offices or from the Small Business 
Administration, Washington 25, D. C. 
The Small Business Administration assumes no responsi-
bility for the accuracy of the data contained herein, nor does 
it necessarily endorse any opinions, conclusions, or recom-
mendations which may be a part of this report. 
JoHN E. HoRNE 
Administrator 
Small Business Administration 
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INTRODUCTION 
XIs STUDY attempts to fill a gap in the literature of 
small business management. Previously there have been few 
studies-particularly empirical studies on the individual firm-
of the role of accounting in small business decisions.1 There 
is a body of prescriptive literature in the areas of financial 
and cost accounting. But, to our knowledge, this is the first 
large-scale empirical examination of how small firms actually 
use accounting data in making operating decisions. 
This study is concerned simultaneously with prescription 
and description. It investigates the role accounting can play, 
seeking to establish norms of reasonable behavior. It also 
determines the actual practices and the reasons for them. 
By interrelating the normative and the descriptive, this study 
attempts to determine the range of the possible; it tries to 
show what small firms can do within the limitations of staff, 
finances, and volumes of sales too small to justify large ex-
penditures on special accounting systems. It tries to indicate 
what better use small firms can make of the data they now 
·have, as well as the use of data that might become available. 
The chief findings result from an intensive analysis of 
approximately 100 case studies of actual small business prac-
tices, 44 of which are specifically cited in the text. A research 
team visited the cooperating firms and interviewed the key 
executives. These interviews uncovered various types of de-
cisions in a single firm. In almost all of the companies 
pricing decisions were important; therefore, the research team 
gave them special attention. A second emphasis was upon 
investment decisions, e.g., the purchase of a plant, equip-
ment, or inventory. In a few of the firms miscellaneous 
situations deserved attention, e.g., decisions concerned with 
liquidation, with changes in the product mix, and with the 
choice between making and buying an item. Pricing and 
investment decisions were emphasized because of the oppor-
tunity to make a more thorough comparative study of the 
subjects in the setting of small business than had ever before 
been undertaken. 
The team deliberately did not attempt to obtain a 
representative sample of firms. Instead it took advantage of 
the willingness of certain firms to cooperate and of previous 
contacts with business managers. The managers spoke 
frankly and provided opportunities for persistent follow-ups. 
A representative sample would necessarily include firms in 
which this frankness and cooperation would be more limited. 
In any case, the study does cover a wide range of small 
business situations. 
1 See Clinton W. Bennett, "A Case Study of Small Business Con-
trols," N.A.C.A. Bulletin, XXIX (April 15, 1948), 991-1026; Harry 
Hodgson, "Installation of Management Accounting in a Small Busi-
ness," Accountant, CXXXV (July 28, Aug. 4, 1956), 76-9, 111-3; 
Peter Jardine, "Applications of Management Accounting Techniques to 
Small Business," Cost Accountant, XXXIV (June, 1955), 6-17. 
The Small Business Administration's criteria for "small" have been 
used here. In general, a small business is independently owned and 
operated and is not dominant in its field of operation. For specific in-
dustries, additional criteria are: ( l ) manufacturing firms must have no 
more than 500 employees, or in some special cases no more than 1,000; 
(2) wholesale concerns must have annual receipts of no more than $5 
million; ( 3) retail outlets must have annual receipts of no more than 
$1 million or in some cases no more than $2 million; ( 4) service out-
lets must have annual receipts of no more than $1 million; ( 5) con-
struction firms must have annual receipts of no more than $5 million; 
( 6) trucking and warehousing firms must have annual receipts of no 
more than $2 million. One department store (noted in the text) is the 
only exception to the criteria. 
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1be team avoided structured interviews. A question-
naire would not have allowed so thorough an analysis. This 
was made clear when the interviewees' initial answers to 
questions often proved upon more intensive investigation to 
be superficial. A continual probing into responses was nec-
essary to determine how the firms actually did make their 
decisions. 
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ACCOUNTING AND ECONOMICS: THEIR 
RELATION TO DECISION MAKING 
[JT IS GENERALLY recognized that both accounting 
data and logic of economics enter into business decisions. 
Exactly what their respective contributions are or what they 
potentially might be is, however, not clearly defined. This 
chapter attacks the problem of definition, not by an empirical 
analysis of actual cases but by an a priori examination of 
functions. Accounting provides the data while managerial 
economics offers a system for handling those data in making 
decisions; such, roughly, is the nature of the relationship 
between accounting and economics. This study examines 
the relationship between accounting and economics in small 
business firms and evaluates the use these firms do make and 
can make of accounting data. 
ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS DECISIONS 
Traditionally, management decision making has not been 
a main emphasis of accounting. Financial accounting and 
cost accounting stress the reporting of a firm's progress 
and the control of costs. The result has been lack of clarity 
about what role accounting can play in decisions. Figure 1 
shows the relationship between various branches of account-
ing and their ultimate uses. It suggests that only variable 
cost systems and nonintegrated cost analyses aim directly at 
providing data for decisions. Accounting is predominantly 
used for other purposes. Only in recent years have account-
ants stressed the uses of accounting in internal management 
of the firm. 
One approach to the role of accounting in business 
decisions is to examine the decision-making process. This 
process consists of several steps: 
1. Recognition of the need for a decision. 
2. Determination of alternative courses of action. 
3. Assembly of and organization of relevant infor-
mation. 
4. Evaluation of each alternative. 
5. Choice of one of the alternatives. 
6. Follow-up of the decision. 
The importance of accounting in the last step is clear. 
Both financial accounting and cost accounting report his-
torical data which aid in following up past decisions. Since 
a decision looks to the future rather than the past, we are 
concerned primarily with the part accounting can play in 
the recognition that a need for a decision exists and the as-
sembly of relevant information. 
Recognition of the need for a decision 
A decision involves a change from a less desirable po-
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Figure 1. A classification of accounting methods with reference 
to the ultimate use of the data 
Accounting Methods 
INTEGRATED IN THE 
GENERAL LEDGER: 
Financial Accounting: 
Statement preparation 
Statement analysis 
Funds analysis 
Subsidiary records keeping 
Cost Accounting: 
Variable cost systems 
Absorption: 
Historical cost systems 
Predetermined cost systems 
NOT INTEGRATED: 
Budgeting 
Auditing 
Cost Analysis: 
Programed analysis 
Nonprogramed analysis 
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sition to one which is more desirable. In order for this 
change to take place, the present position must be compared 
with a preconceived notion of what is desirable. Accounting 
data are important in this phase for they provide the best 
assessment of the present available to the businessman. 
The concept of homeostasis helps describe this kind of 
behavior. Homeostasis is the tendency of organisms to re-
turn to a given structure in the face of changing conditions. 
Kenneth Boulding has incorporated this idea into the theory 
of the firm. In his words: "The simplest theory of the firm 
is to assume that there is a 'homeostasis of the balance 
sheet' -that there is some desired quantity of all the various 
items in the balance sheet, and that any disturbance of this 
structure immediately sets in motion forces which will re-
store the status quo."1 Perhaps the emphasis should not be 
on the status quo but on a moving set of preferences over 
time. Thus, actual events are continually compared with a 
dynamically shifting set of standards. 
Homeostasis and financial accounting. As Boulding's 
statement suggests, the accountant's balance sheet stimulates 
decisions because it reports conditions that can be compared 
to homeostatic norms. For example, the value of liquid 
assets may exceed some predetermined criteria of balance. 
This may lead to a consideration of alternatives such as ex-
pansion of facilities or the payment of dividends. The re-
lationship between assets and creditor-owner claims may not 
be the one that is desired. This condition could lead to 
liquidation of outstanding debt or to increased debt, depend-
ing upon the set of preferences. The balance sheet may not 
be as important for internal decision making as for external 
relations with stockholders and creditors; nevertheless, it is 
a stimulus to action by internal management. 
Even more important in stimulating decisions is the 
income statement. Whether or not the objective is the max-
imum profit or a satisfactory profit, there is always interest 
1 Kenneth E. Boulding, A Reconstruction of Economics (New 
York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1950), p. 27. 
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in the reported income. As recent studies have revealed, 
many firms have predetermined notions of desired profit, 
whether it be called a "target figure," or a "reasonable" 
profit, or an "adequate" return. The income statement pro-
vides the means by which the firm can compare its actual 
position with its goal. The items in the income statement 
which, when arranged, give net income can likewise be 
judged on the basis of predetermined norms. For example, 
a particular expense item when taken in relation to sales 
may exceed a set figure and may in turn lead to a deter-
mination of alternatives. 
More refined analyses of accounting statements such as 
ratio analysis, common-size statements, and common-dollar 
statements are direct applications of the idea of homeostasis. 
The mere fact that such analyses are used indicates that the 
present situation is being examined with reference to pre-
conceived ideas of acceptability. The use of ratio analysis 
implies comparison with industry averages, trade association 
suggestions, or past experience. Common-size statements 
allow analysis to be made of component items within a 
statement with reference to the whole. This again shows the 
concern for desired relationships. 
Other financial accounting methods also illustrate the 
homeostasis concept. Working capital analysis, source and 
application of funds analysis, and creditor and debtor claims 
analysis are methods which present information concerning 
the present state of affairs for comparison with sets of pref-
erences. All of these methods are concerned with balance 
sheet and income statement items. However, the infor-
mation is arranged to reveal certain relationships which are 
not entirely evident in the usual financial statement presen-
tation. The purpose is to make comparisons and discover 
possible needs for decision making. 
Homeostasis and cost accounting. A discussion of cost 
accounting might include a variety of topics. The present 
discussion is concerned with the relationship between certain 
cost accounting techniques and the recognition of the need 
8 
for decisions. This emphasis directs attention to cost control 
techniques rather than to the other features of cost account-
ing. All control techniques incorporate at least these four 
steps: 
l. Information on the actual state of affairs. 
2. Comparison of the actual state with a predetermined 
norm. 
3. Determination of the magnitude of any deviation. 
4. Action which makes the actual match the predeter-
mined norm. 
Standard cost accounting systems integrate to some 
extent the concept of homeostasis into the ledger. The first 
phase of decision making (recognizing the need for decision) 
has been partly routinized. Standard cost systems require a 
set of preferences for costs and a set of preferences for the 
amount of deviation that will be tolerated. It is too ex-
pensive to revise the standards continually as objectives 
change, but changed preferences can be taken into account 
in the analysis of cost variances. For interim operations, the 
set of preferences is expressed by the tolerable zone of var-
iance. For example, a 10 percent variance or below is tol-
erated initially; but as the concern for lower costs and in-
creased efficiency intensifies, the tolerable variance may drop 
to 6 percent. If a variance develops which exceeds manage-
ment's aim, decision making is activated. 
A familiar example of the homeostasis idea is budgeting. 
Constructing and using a budget requires a set of preferences 
be established for operations of the entire firm and decisions 
be stimulated when the budgeted amounts are exceeded. 
Assembly and organization of relevant information 
Accounting assembles information on alternative courses 
of action in two ways. The first method attempts to rou-
tinize the collection of relevant data and may be called 
programed analysis. The data used in such an analysis may 
come from general ledger accounts, but are arranged in a 
form which aids in decision making. The second method is 
9 
the specific cost study, nonprogramed analysis, which de-
velops information for specific decisions. One of the major 
issues in this volume is the extent to which small businessmen 
can profit from these two approaches. 
There is a wide variety of ways in which data can be 
organized for decisions. The objective should be to arrange 
the data in a form that brings simplicity out of complexity, 
that focuses attention on the most important variables, and 
that facilitates further analysis. Such arrangements may then 
lead to further statistical treatment or to subjective evalu-
ations by management. As an illustration, a firm may seek 
organized data on the sales of various items, arranged by 
sizes and shapes, in order to help it forecast the sizes and 
shapes that will be demanded in the future. It may wish 
sales data organized by territories to indicate where sales are 
increasing or decreasing. Such arrangements bring out 
pertinent factors involved in decisions. Probably of greatest 
interest to the manager of a firm is that arrangement of data 
which emphasizes the impact of decisions on costs. The 
most useful analysis for him in this respect, it would seem, 
involves specifically the incremental costs, i.e., those costs 
which will be affected by some particular decision. 
Programed methods. The following three accounting 
methods are representative of analyses which provide incre-
mental data systematically. The accounting system can be 
designed by account classification to generate such data 
systematically, or as is the usual case, the data can be taken 
from ordinary financial accounts and rearranged in the form 
suggested by incremental analysis. 
1. Direct costing is defined as the segregation of fixed 
and variable costs.2 For many management decisions, this 
segregation is necessary in order to reveal cost-profit-volume 
relationships. Direct costing identifies only variable costs 
with products, thus giving management product cost data as 
a function of output. It should be obvious that this type of 
2 See National Association of Cost Accountants, Direct Costing, 
N.A.C.A. Research Report No. 23, April 1, 1953. 
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routinized accounting method moves in the direction of the 
incremental approach to decision making. 
The allocation of fixed costs to products on some arbi-
trary basis may result in confusion on some decisions. Direct 
costing attempts to do away with this possibility by avoiding 
overhead allocations. Cost information so developed may 
correspond closely to marginal costs or incremental costs. 
In fact, to the extent that direct costs and variable costs 
are synonomous, and to the extent that variable costs ap-
proximate marginal cost (in the case of little or no curvature 
of the total cost function), direct costs are synonomous with 
marginal costs. 
2. Marginal income analysis is a routinized approach 
similar to direct costing.3 This method is more universally 
applicable in that it can be applied to any "segment," i.e., 
cause of costs. Effective use requires that segments be care-
fully identified and that an accurate distinction be made 
between the fixed and variable costs of each segment. The 
basic ideas involved are similar to those in breakeven analysis 
as shown in figure 2. 
In actual use of the analysis, primary emphasis is placed 
on marginal balances (sales minus variable costs) and mar-
ginal income ratios (gross profit to sales). With this type of 
information flowing systematically to decision makers, de-
cisions can be based on pertinent costs. The analysis aids 
both shortrun and longrun decisions: shortrun decisions con-
cerning increased or decreased volume require variable cost 
information; longrun decisions, which involve abandoning 
the segment, require data on both variable costs and escap-
able fixed costs. 
This method is concerned with the relative contribution 
of each segment to unassigned fixed costs and profit. No 
attempt is made to allocate common overhead, nor is there 
concern that each segment should carry its "fair share of 
s See James S. Earley, "Recent Developments in Cost Accounting 
and the 'Marginal Analysis,'" Journal of Political Economy, LXIII 
(June, 1955), 227-42. 
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Figure 2. A segment profit chart prepared according to marginal 
income analysis concepts 
Contribution 
Margin ($) 
+4000 
+3000 
+2000 
+tooo 
0 
-1000 
-2000 
-3000 
---
2 4 
---
6 
Marginal Income 
at $0.50 per unit 
~ 
8 10 i2 14 
OUTPUT (in thousands) 
16 18 20 
For an example of one use of this management accounting tool, 
assume that the segment has escapable fixed costs of $3,000, variable 
costs of $0.50 per unit, sales price of $1.00 per unit, and output at 
10,000 units {P). The contribution of this segment is then $2,000, as 
read from the vertical axis. Management proposes to lower the price to 
$0.80 in an effort to stimulate volume in this segment. The extent to 
which this decision is profitable depends upon the responsiveness of 
demand to price decreases. For example, an increase in output from 
10,000 units to 17,000 (Q) results in the same contribution margin 
($2,000), but if output increases to 20,000 units (R), contribution 
margin will increase to $3,000. Thus, an estimate of elasticity of 
demand must accompany the estimate of cost variability for the analysis 
to be complete. 
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overhead." Rather, the relevant criterion is measured in 
terms of the ratio of marginal balance (contribution) to in-
vestment employed in each segment. 
3. Merchandise management accounting (M.M.A.) is 
an application of programed analysis to retail stores.4 
M.M.A. is one of several recent developments in retailing 
which attempt to focus attention on the proper use of var-
iable cost information. In particular, attention is directed 
away from gross margins in merchandising decisions to con-
trollable profits which reflect variable costs of items. This 
is consistent with the intent of previously discussed pro-
gramed analyses. 
M.M.A. illustrates the growing concern for incre-
mental information in retailing. A similar development, con-
tribution plan accounting, is also replacing methods empha-
sizing gross markups and net income. Contribution plan ac-
counting places emphasis on the contribution of departments 
to indirect costs (all of which may not be fixed); M.M.A. 
goes one step further by emphasizing the contribution of 
each inventory item to fixed costs. 
Limitations of programed analyses. This short discussion 
of programed analyses merely introduces the principles under-
lying these methods; it also raises several objections. 
There are accounting techniques designed to systematize 
the flow of data for operating decisions. Yet these methods 
serve multiple purposes and may not always supply the data 
needed for a particular decision. 
These programed analyses make use of many simplifying 
assumptions in separating fixed and variable elements of 
costs. Once established in the accounts, the separation may 
be used in decisions for which the original assumptions are 
not valid. 
4 See Robert I. Jones, Merchandise Management Accounting in 
Practice (Chicago: Arthur Anderson and Co., 1957); special issue on 
merchandise management accounting, Journal of Retailing, XXXIV 
(Spring, 1958); Malcolm P. McNair and Eleanor G. May, "Pricing for 
Profit: A Revolutionary Approach to Retail Accounting," Harvard Busi-
ness Review, XXXV (May-June, 1957), 105-22. 
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There is, therefore, the question of whether any such 
routinized separation of costs might encourage inflexibility 
and lead to unsound business decisions. 
Nonprogramed analyses. Ad hoc analyses attempt to 
overcome the alleged weaknesses of systematic accumulation 
of data. A leading spokesman for specific cost analysis, Wil-
liam Vatter, contends that the weaknesses of programed 
analyses are too great to overcome: each decision is con-
cerned with a unique situation which requires special data.5 
Special cost analysis based on income statements is one 
approach to nonprogramed analysis. Projected statements 
can be prepared for each alternative course of action. The 
alternative which has the greatest income potential is 
favored, subject to certain qualifications. For example, the 
increased income may be less than what management con-
siders an adequate return on additional investment. Pro-
jecting the entire income statement is not necessary; it is 
possible to restrict attention to the costs and revenues that 
will change as a result of the decision. 
Nonprogramed analyses do overcome the one important 
weakness of programed methods: the accounting data for 
each decision are selected especially for the situation. But, 
no matter how carefully selected, accounting data cannot 
cover all the important costs. With the application of the 
correct principles of decision making, the manager of the 
small firm can take the relevant information from his ac-
counts while bearing in mind its limitations. 
MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS IN 
BUSINESS DECISIONS 
Economics has both descriptive and prescriptive sides. As a 
descriptive science, it attempts to generalize about the re-
lations among economic variables; this requires the study of 
5 "Tailor-Making Cost Data for Specific Uses," N.A.C.A. Bulletin, 
1954 Conference Proceedings, pp. 1691-1707. Reprinted in William E. 
Thomas, Jr. ( ed.), Readings in Cost Accounting, Budgeting and Con-
trol (Cincinnati: South-Western Publishing Co., 1955), pp. 314-32. 
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actual behavior. But, as prescription, economics often pro-
ceeds in a nonempirical way, starting with certain premises 
and deriving logical consequences. Much of managerial eco-
nomics follows the latter course. It often starts, for example, 
with the simplifying assumption that the firm seeks to maxi-
mize profits; the analysis then develops the logical con-
clusions following from that assumption. This is not the 
end of managerial economics, however, for there may be 
cases in which the assumption of profit maximization is not 
appropriate and adjustments for other objectives are neces-
sary. It may turn out that the conclusions derived from 
strict logic are difficult or expensive to apply in actual busi-
ness, so that modifications to meet the actualities of business 
are necessary. At the outset, managerial economics fre-
quently assumes that information is cost free, so that the 
manager can inject the necessary data into a logical model 
and simply await the results. In actual practice the cost of 
data collection may preclude the use of the most refined 
analysis. 
The principles of managerial economics 
The logic of managerial economics is simple when ex-
amined in broad perspective. When applied to business 
problems, it may be contained in four basic principles. 
1. The Incremental Principle: a decision is sound if 
it increases revenue more than costs, or if it reduces costs 
more than revenue. 
A decision involves change, often in both costs and 
revenues. The incremental principle simply states that it is 
necessary to compare incremental costs with incremental 
revenues. This means that average costs, or full costs, and 
average revenues are not the proper focus of attention. Our 
case studies show, however, that many decisions are, in fact, 
based on average or full costs and that this practice is not 
always in conflict with the incremental principle. 
Unfortunately, the concepts of incremental cost and 
incremental revenue are ambiguous and vary according to 
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the time perspective. A cost which is not incremental for 
a short period may be incremental in the long run. Further-
more the distinction between the short run and the long 
run is not nearly so neat in business practice as in the ele-
mentary economics textbook. As we show, some decisions 
involving a few months of time will be similar in character 
to decisions in other industries involving many years. There 
is a whole range of short runs, depending on the nature of 
the issue at hand. Some decisions require only a consider-
ation of immediate effects; others involve estimation of the 
total consequences of the decision over a period of time. 
2. The Principle of Time Perspective: a decision should 
take into account the shortrun and the longrun effects on 
revenue and costs, giving appropriate weight to the most 
relevant time periods. 
Perhaps a few simple illustrations will reduce the am-
biguities of this principle. Take, for example, a decision 
whether or not to accept a particular order for which the 
customer has specified that he will pay no more than $5.00 
per unit for 1,000 units. Suppose that the full cost is $7.00, 
but that the incremental cost is $4.00. This difference arises 
from the fact that certain costs included in full costs are 
unaffected by the decision-they will run on whether or not 
the order is taken. Considered on a shortrun basis, the in-
cremental revenue of $5,000 and the incremental cost of 
$4,000 produce $1,000 of added income. It is necessary, how-
ever, to examine possible longer run repercussions. Will this 
customer and others refuse to pay higher prices in the future 
if a price concession is made now? Will prices paid by other 
customers be affected? Will the offer tie up productive ca-
pacity which might be used for more lucrative orders? 
A similar study of both longrun and shortrun consider-
ations enters into the decision on raising prices when demand 
is favorable. This point is discussed more fully in connection 
with individual cases. 
3. The Discounting Principle: if a decision affects costs 
and revenues at future dates, it is necessary to discount those 
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costs and revenues down to present values before a valid 
comparison of alternatives is possible. 
The discounting principle is particularly important in 
the evaluation of investment decisions, especially on fixed 
assets expected to last for a long time. There may be cases, 
especially when only a short period is involved, in which 
discounting can be ignored for practical purposes, but such 
cases are better examined individually. 
Discounting reflects the fact that revenues far in the 
future have less value today than those nearer at hand. A 
dollar to be earned ten years from now is less valuable than 
one tomorrow, for there wi11 be no opportunity to earn 
revenue from it in the ten-year period. To i11ustrate, $38.54 
in cash today will at cumulative earnings of 10 percent 
amount to $100 ten years from now. If 10 percent is the 
true earning rate (opportunity cost of capital), then $100 to 
be earned ten years from now is worth no more than $38.54. 
We discount the $100 by dividing it by (l+r)"' (where r is 
the interest rate and n the number of years) to determine its 
present value. In this case the failure to discount means that 
we overvalue future do11ars by almost three times as com-
pared with present dollars. 
4. The Opportunity Cost Principle: decision making re-
quires a careful measurement of opportunity costs, that is, 
of the sacrifices required by a decision. 
The discounting principle is closely related to a broader 
concept, of which it is actually a particular application-the 
concept of opportunity costs. The cost of selecting any 
alternative in making a decision consists of the sacrifice of 
other alternatives required by that decision. One of the 
costs of taking a vacation trip, for example, is the sacrifice 
of the gardening one might have accomplished. Since a cost 
is a cost only if a sacrifice is involved, we can state dogmat-
ically that all costs relevant to decision making are opportun-
ity costs. 
The incremental costs discussed earlier in this chapter 
are opportunity costs. The reason that fixed or sunk costs 
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are irrelevant to some decisions is that the decision will not 
affect them-no sacrifice is required. It is not reasonable to 
let a decision be influenced by so-called "costs" which, in 
fact, involve no pain of any kind and no impact on profits. 
A variety of cort concepts 
Perhaps this is the appropriate point to introduce certain 
cost concepts that will appear at various points in this study, 
with some clarification of how they are related. "Marginal 
cost" is a widely used term in economics closely related to 
the "incremental cost" concept already mentioned. By 
marginal cost is meant the increase in total cost resulting 
from adding one more unit of output. By incremental cost 
is meant the change in total cost resulting from a decision. 
While the two terms are often used to mean the same thing, 
the latter is more flexible, since it can be applied not only 
to volume changes but to any other changes in costs re-
sulting from a decision. Also incremental costs are not 
necessarily (or usually) restricted to a change in one unit 
of volume. Since businessmen usually think in terms of 
finite changes in volume, the incremental cost concept is 
probably more suited to our purposes than the marginal cost 
concept. In any case, both the incremental and marginal 
cost concepts are an application of what is known as "mar-
ginalism" in economics-the comparison of changes in totals. 
The distinction between fixed and variable costs is too 
well known to require much discussion here. Usually this 
distinction refers to shortrun volume-cost relationships, the 
fixed costs being those unaffected by volume of output and 
the variable costs being those affected by volume. But in 
decision making, volume may not always be the issue; we may 
speak, therefore, of the fixed costs as those that are not af-
fected by the decision and of the variable costs as those that 
are affected. Variable costs may run close to the marginal or 
incremental costs, and often it is convenient to use them 
synonomously. 
The distinction between "implicit costs" and "explicit 
18 
costs" will be important in some of the case discussions. 
Explicit costs are those recognized in the accounting state-
ments. But these statements do not always take into ac-
count all of the costs of interest to the economist; in other 
words, they do not reflect all of the opportunity costs. "Im-
plicit costs" are opportunity costs not explicitly recognized 
in the accounting statements. The most elementary illus-
tration is the wage of the owner in a sole proprietorship, 
that is, the income he has sacrificed by not working for 
someone else. Very commonly income statements do not · 
take into account the implicit cost involved in the fact that 
the stockholder's funds are tied up in the firm rather than 
invested in other income-producing opportunities. This 
cost is often referred to as "implicit interest." 
The expression "sunk costs" is the antithesis of incre-
mental costs. They are totally unaffected by any decisions 
that might be made. In practical decision-making problems 
some costs are not sunk, but are nevertheless fixed as far 
as the specific shortrun decision is concerned. In fact, just 
what is "fixed" and what is "incremental" varies from one 
problem to the next. Another useful expression is "escapable 
costs," which is really a variation of "incremental costs," but 
which brings out forcefully that the decision involves a re-
duction in cost rather than an increase. For example, if the 
issue is one of abandoning a product line, it is extremely 
important to determine which costs will be avoided by the 
decision and which will continue. 
Another widely known distinction-one that is common 
in accounting practice-is that between direct and overhead 
costs (burden) . Direct costs are those that can be attributed 
directly to a particular product or department. The overhead 
costs are common costs, such as administrative costs or gen-
eral plant costs that cannot be allocated except on some 
arbitrary basis. The expression "direct costs" is sometimes 
used in the same sense as variable costs-thus relating to 
cost-volume relationships rather than to the ease with which 
they may be attributed to particular operations. 
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Economists' criticism of traditional accounting 
Managerial economics provides one framework of 
thought against which we can evaluate the relevance of ac-
counting to decision making. Writers on the subject have 
noted a number of limitations of traditional accounting 
practices when examined in the light of economic theory.6 
We shall discuss the limitations most pertinent to this 
study. 
( 1 ) The orientation of accounting to the past rather 
than to the future. The primary task of accounting is the 
recording of historical events, as opposed to the estimating 
of future, uncertain events. There is a strong tradition that 
accounting should reflect actual incurred costs. The ac-
counting profession and regulatory agencies have attempted 
to limit the amount of personal judgment by establishing 
"conventions," "principles," or "standards." These "guides 
to action" govern the manner in which data are treated in 
the accounts.7 
The managerial economist is less interested than the 
accountant, however, in such historical costs and events. He 
is concerned with future revenues and costs, and the impact 
of decisions on these costs. To the economist, it is irrational 
to permit past costs to influence movements toward optimum 
positions in the future. What he needs is the knowledge of 
how a decision will affect future flows of funds into and out 
of the firm. The economist points to specific cases in which 
the emphasis on historical data has distorted the decision-
making process. We shall be looking for illustrations of this 
distortion in the studies of small business cases that follow. 
( 2) The arbitrary allocation of overhead costs. Cost 
6 Joel Dean, Managerial Economics (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: 
Prentice-Hall, 1951), pp. 12-28. 
7 These remarks refer to the traditional core of accounting. Ac-
counting can be defined broadly to permit estimates, judgments, pre-
dictions, and the other features required by managerial economics. For 
a broad definition of accounting, see "Report of the Committee on 
Management Accounting," Accounting Review, XXXV (July, 1960), 
400. 
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accountants usually make it a practice to allocate overhead 
costs to cost centers and to individual products. It is un-
necessary to review the bases of these allocations; specific 
illustrations will appear later. The economist raises several 
questions about allocation procedures. To the extent that 
the overhead costs are fixed costs, the economist argues that 
they are irrelevant to business decisions, so that no allocation 
is necessary. In any case he doubts that routine systems of 
allocation are invariably appropriate to the variety of de-
CISIOns. 
( 3) The failure to reflect the true opportunity cost. The 
accountant's historical costs reflect the opportunity costs 
only by coincidence. Often the accountant understates 
costs, for his measurements do not reflect certain sacrifices 
involved in choice. "Implicit interest" and "imputed wages" 
are two of many illustrations. The accountant hesitates 
to record a cost unless there is an asset outlay. This means 
that he will fail to record the full opportunity cost of using 
a building whose value for alternative purposes may be much 
greater than the expenses recorded on the books. He may 
not charge as a cost of expanding one product the sacrifices 
that may be required by the contraction of others. 
( 4) The failure of the depreciation charge to reflect 
the true loss in economic value. The economist is frequently 
dissatisfied with the depreciation expense figure computed 
by the accountant. Traditionally this figure is based on 
historical costs rather than future sacrifices; it may not re-
flect the expected loss in the value of assets that is relevant. 
The problem is not simply one of replacement cost versus 
historical cost as a basis for depreciation-a subject that has 
received a great deal of attention in accounting literature. 
More important, accounting data do not measure the future 
loss in value that may be required by a decision, for example, 
to retain a piece of equipment rather than to replace it. 
( 5) The use of shortcuts to accumulate and present 
data. A more general criticism-one that encompasses part 
of those already discussed-is that accounting takes a number 
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of shortcuts in the accumulation and presentation of in-
formation that fall short of the refinement required by a 
complete application of economic analysis. The common 
routine of accounting procedures that runs through financial 
accounting, cost accounting, and even some of the variable 
costing techniques fails to measure the exact quantities 
needed for each decision. Even in special studies, the ac-
countant tends to take shortcuts, as is illustrated by the 
"accountant's method" for handling investment decisions. 
The fact that accounting does not do everything that 
economic theory might ask of it is not necessarily a criticism 
of accounting practices. Since traditional accounting and 
economics are concerned with different questions, it should 
be no surprise that they often find different answers. There 
can be no dogmatic conclusions about what degree of 
theoretical refinement is justified in practical, day-to-day 
business, especially the small business in which the expenses 
of refinement are a real barrier to the full application of 
economic analysis. We hope that an intensive study of 
actual cases will help determine the extent to which small 
firms can afford to carry their analysis, whether this analysis 
is accounting or economic in character. 
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2 
GARDEN AND LANDSCAPE NURSERIES 
u4 T FIRST glance one might well wonder at the sig-
nificance attached to plant nurseries by giving over a whole 
chapter to discussing them. But in the nursery industry the 
contribution of accounting to decisions is of such special 
interest that it deserves a full discussion. In some respects 
nurseries stand in an extreme position-one at which the 
usual accounting methods appear to offer the least to de-
cision making. The question is whether a development of 
new accounting methods or of new tools for the systematic 
application of economic analysis is warranted in the nursery 
industry. 
This chapter covers only nurseries that grow a majority 
of their own plants. It is not concerned with retail nurseries 
that purchase their plants; their problems are much like 
those of the retailers discussed later. Three types of nurseries 
are covered: ( 1) two retail nurseries, which engage in the 
wholesale business on a small scale both as buyers and sellers, 
but concentrate on propagating and growing plants for sale 
directly to the consumer; ( 2) two wholesale nurseries, which 
sell most of their product to retail outlets of various sorts-
garden stores, landscaping firms, etc., and also do a small 
volume of direct retail business; ( 3) one landscaping firm, 
which grows plants only because the management believes 
there is no other dependable source of supply. 
The first part of this chapter is empirical, summarizing 
findings on the actual practices of these nurseries. The sec-
ond and main part, however, involves the construction of a 
theoretical economic model against which actual practice is 
evaluated. 
Interviews with the managers of these nurseries suggest 
that the following decisions are among the most important. 
l. What plants to propagate and grow. These decisions 
govern the allocation of the nursery's land to various plant 
materials. We can call these "plant mix" decisions. 
2. What prices to charge for the coming season. 
3. What prices to reduce and what plants to destroy 
when plants tie up land longer than is economical. 
4. At what ages plants are to be sold. These decisions 
are closely related to the pricing decisions, but there are 
times at which a nursery may discourage or refuse a sale at 
the quoted price in order to permit a plant to mature. 
This list of crucial decisions is arbitrary. Other decisions 
may be of equal importance-such as those concerning ad-
vertising and sales promotion or those concerning the hiring 
of personneJ.l Rather than cover the whole range of de-
1 As a matter of fact one owner-manager clearly was more con-
cerned with his personnel situation than with other problems-and for 
good reasons. 
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cisions, we confine the discussion to those listed, especially 
the first two. 
SOME GENERALIZATIONS 
While the sample of firms is small and not altogether repre-
sentative, we believe that several generalizations on the role 
of accounting in nurseries can be justified. These are based 
not only on the case interviews, but also on discussions with 
industry authorities, and on articles in bulletins and trade 
journals. 
1. Accounting plays an insignificant role in the crucial 
decisions in the nursery business. Cost accounting is almost 
unknown, but there have been experiments with cost finding; 
most nursery people apparently do not believe these ex-
periments have been profitable. Little attempt is made to 
determine the costs of particular product lines. In fact, 
even the separation of the costs of landscaping from those 
of retailing and those of propagation and growing is usually 
done loosely and inaccurately. One of the firms studied 
does break revenue data down into 21 categories but has 
been less successful in allocating costs to these categories. 
2. When accounting does influence nursery decision 
making, it is through the income statement. The concept 
of homeostasis introduced in Chapter l seems to describe 
the way some of the nursery managers make use of ac-
counting information. If their annual income seems "un-
reasonably" low-that is, if it falls short of some prede-
termined standard of appropriate income-the managers 
become interested in action that will correct the situation. 
They may then go over their price lists for the coming year 
and raise prices on items they "feel" are not making the 
requisite profit. Since they have no cost figures on indi-
vidual plants, they do not really know which items are un-
profitable, but they have subjective beliefs (supported by 
knowledge of the relative labor time expended on different 
products, etc.). Their ability to raise prices is conditioned 
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by market demand; they are unable to raise prices on some 
unprofitable lines. 
Similarly, dissatisfaction with profits may lead to re-
consideration of the plant mix, with a gradual shift to 
plants that are thought to be more profitable. But our case 
studies suggest that propagation and growing decisions are 
more frequently affected by the volume of sales than by esti-
mates of profits; if a plant is "moving," the nursery continues 
to grow it. If the trend of volume of certain items is upward, 
the nursery usually allocates more space to them. 
While the one accounting figure that does seem to in-
fluence decision making is "income," this figure is rather 
peculiar because of the nature of accounting in the nursery 
industry.2 The nurseries covered in this study measure their 
income without regard to the inventory of plants. Some of 
them operate on a "cash" basis. But even the firm that 
maintains accounts on an accrual basis does not estimate 
the value of plants; this is done in conformity with income 
tax regulations. Thus a nursery that ends a year with a 
greater volume of plant materials in the ground or in the 
warehouse than at the beginning does not reflect this fact in 
its income figure. From a practical point of view there is 
much to be said for not taking the increased value of in-
ventory into account, for any estimates of such values are 
inevitably conjectural. From the economic point of view, 
however, it does not make sense to ignore inventories, for 
they represent values as much as other assets. Therefore 
the accounting figure that has the greatest influence on de-
cisions in nurseries is somewhat questionable. 
3. All the firms covered by this study are concerned 
with demand and the competition underlying demand in 
their decisions. Some of the managers stress cost considera-
2 It is possible that even this phase of accounting is not of great 
importance in decision making. When nurserymen talk about "in-
come," they probably are not always referring to a figure on the income 
statement. In small firms there is usually some knowledge of income 
before the accountant makes up his statements. 
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tions at the beginning of the interviews, but all of them give 
examples of how demand factors tend to dominate some 
decisions. Demand as used here includes the forces of 
competition, that is, the prices charged by other nurseries 
and the likelihood that other nurseries might react to the 
policies of the firm under study. Several specific illustrations 
from the case studies should clarify this point. 
One manager stated that he could not charge more for 
his flowering shrubs (even though they were not "profit-
able") because he had to face the competition of plants 
grown more cheaply in a favorable climate elsewhere. He 
continued to grow the plants because some customers ex-
pected him to maintain a complete line. He recognized that 
competition placed a ceiling on what he could charge. 
Another manager discussed the same point in a dif-
ferent way. He felt the pressure of competition from 
nurseries to the south and north: to the south, cost and 
prices are lower; to the north, they are higher. He thought 
that he had to maintain his prices between these two. But 
it became clear upon further questioning that he did not 
study the prices of these competing nurseries systematically. 
He "believed" that he set his prices between the two levels. 
Most of the firms used rather informal forecasting pro-
cedures for estimating future demand. These forecasts were 
the basis for planting decisions, which would, of course, de-
termine what plants would be available in future years. One 
procedure was to note trends-for example, the movement 
to ranch style houses, for which tall evergreens are not 
suited-and to project these trends into the future. Another 
was to discuss developments with customers (especially in 
the case of the wholesale growers whose customers were 
retailers closer to the ultimate market) . One manager con-
sulted builders about new developments in housing and 
their implications for the demand for plants. 
Why cost accounting is not used 
Why do nursery managers not make greater use of cost 
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accounting? The interviewees suggested a number of 
reasons. 
1. The erratic behavior of the weather and its unpre-
dictable effects on different kinds of plants make it difficult 
to estimate costs. Should one take into account in measuring 
the costs of a particular plant the fact that the past winter 
was particularly severe and wiped out half of the crop, or 
should one try to average such losses over the years? 
2. It is difficult to allocate labor costs to the various 
plants or even to the major categories of business. All the 
firms transfer workers constantly from one activity to 
another; hence it is difficult to determine how much time is 
spent on each. One of the firms goes to a great deal of 
trouble to keep time records on various categories of business, 
but the management complains that the employees do not 
make accurate entries. 
3. A difficult conceptual problem of allocating the 
costs of the land occurs, especially when land values are 
changing rapidly, as is true for those nurseries located near 
cities. Similarly, the allocation of other overhead costs, such 
as management time, presents problems. 
4. The problem of how to treat the costs of destroyed 
materials is difficult to solve. Nurseries find it necessary to 
destroy plants that are using up valuable space but have 
not been sold. As such plants get older and larger, the 
costs of removing them rises and the amount of land a 
single plant ties up increases.3 Therefore a time comes when 
plants must be destroyed. It is difficult to determine in ad-
vance the cost of destruction and how it should be allocated. 
Though these reasons for the failure to make use of 
cost accounting are representative, there may be others 
equally important or perhaps even more fundamental. The 
buildup of costs by adding together labor, materials, and 
overhead, which is common in manufacturing, does not 
s This results from the fact that as more and more plants are sold 
from a given block of land, the remaining plants occupy more land 
per unit. 
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seem applicable to decision making in the nursery business. 
Knowing the "full cost" of each item is not particularly 
important, though it is desirable to have information about 
incremental costs. The allocation of the rentals on land is 
likewise unnecessary, even misleading, and the same is true 
for the allocation of overhead. Too much effort on normal 
cost accounting procedures could do more harm than good 
by distracting management's attention from the factors that 
should influence key decisions. 
In some cases cost analysis may be profitable. One of 
the firms made a special study of its truck costs, finding that 
in some seasons the use of three-man crews on trucks was · 
uneconomical. The study led to the reduction of the crews 
to two men in July, August, September, January, and Feb-
ruary. The same firm made a thorough study of the propor-
tion of time its trucks were in use and determined that it 
would be economical to purchase an extra truck as a standby. 
No doubt such analyses are useful, but they are quite dif-
ferent from determinations of how much different plants 
"cost." 
Very strangely, few of the managers interviewed had 
given formal attention to one of their most important costs 
from the economic point of view-the opportunity cost in 
growing one variety rather than alternatives.4 If one wanted 
to measure the cost of a particular variety of plants, he 
should be concerned as to whether that variety takes three 
years or ten years to mature, since the longer period involves 
a greater cumulative sacrifice of revenue from alternatives. 
Doubtless the prices these nurseries charge do reflect the 
time periods required in maturing plants (prices for large 
plants are almost universally higher than those for small 
ones of the same variety) . The managers recognize that 
land is tied up longer on such plants, but they do not appear 
to have thought through the discounting principles involved 
in a sound treatment of this problem. 
4 For a full discussion of the opportunity cost concept, see Chap-
ter 2. 
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A note on nursery cost accounting literature 
Articles on nursery accounting confirm the conclusion 
that cost accounting has not made much progress in the 
industry.5 Most of the systems that have been tried are not 
the usual cost systems. Some consist of piecemeal attempts 
at controlling certain costs, for example, by establishing 
standard labor times; others may be described as "cost 
finding" -ad hoc methods of determining the full cost of 
certain operations. Some systems merely try to allocate 
revenues and costs to different activities in the hope that 
this will show the relative profitability of these activities. 
Most of the nurseries' cost accounting appears to be di-
rected at the costs of landscaping. The objective here is to 
obtain estimates of the times required for various land-
scaping jobs (including travel time), to serve as the basis 
for pricing. The nursery accounting literature has a "full 
cost" bias and shows very little evidence of any impact of 
economic analysis. 
A PRESCRIPTIVE MODEL FOR NURSERIES 
Few nurseries apply any formal analysis to decision making. 
The question is whether an economic model for rational de-
cision making would be profitable in the industry. The con-
struction of such a model should in any case help evaluate 
present methods used by management in reaching decisions 
and should also provide an additional basis for analyzing the 
role of accounting. 
An economic model for the nursery industry starts with 
"revenue estimating" rather than "cost accounting." The 
initial construction of the model involves drastic simplifying 
assumptions, most of which are removed as the discussion 
proceeds, drawing the analysis to a closer approximation of 
reality. The initial assumptions are: 
5 See W. J. Billerbeck, "Cost Accounting for the Nurseryman," 
American Nurseryman, CX (Nov. 1, 1959), 14, 60-71. Also Harold 
Hunziker, Knowing Your Landscape Costs (Davenport, Iowa: National 
Landscape Nurserymen's Association, 1957). 
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I. The nursery owns a given amount of land. 
2. The demand schedules for all the plants are known 
with certainty. This means not only that the immediate de-
mand is known; it also means that the position of demand at 
future dates within the decision-making "horizon" is known. 
3. The breakdown between fixed and variable costs is 
known. 
4. The risks due to weather, plant disease, etc., are 
known. 
5. There are no difficulties in allocating incremental 
costs to particular plants. 
6. The cost of capital is known. 
7. The firm wishes to maximize profits. 
Certainty model: plant mix decisions 
Suppose the nursery owns land that is completely clear 
of plants and wishes to make decisions about the plant mix. 
Under the given assumptions management can make rational 
planting decisions simply by applying economic analysis. 
The problem is to select those plants in quantities that 
maximize the future net revenues (revenues minus incre-
mental costs) from the land. The objective is to maximize 
the contribution that future net revenues make to fixed 
costs and profits. 
It is clear that a correct evaluation of future revenues 
and costs must involve application of the discounting prin-
ciple. Revenues expected from plants sold five years hence 
should be discounted more heavily than revenues to be re-
ceived two years from now. The longer the time before 
harvest, the longer the resources of the company are tied up 
and the greater the sacrifice of revenues from alternative ac-
tivities that are involved. The cost of capital, which is as-
sumed to be known, should be used as the discount rate.6 
6 The determination of the cost of capital is a highly technical 
subject beyond the scope of this volume. It requires that the manager 
make estimates of rates of return that can be earned in alternative in-
vestments. In view of confusion on the subject, it seems fair to say that 
the subjective estimates of management should suffice. 
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There are two theoretically correct formulas for hand-
ling the discounting problem: computation of the dis-
counted rate of return (which can be compared with the 
cost of capital) and estimation of the present value (which 
requires discounting of future revenues and costs by the cost 
of capital). These formulas may be found in any book on 
capital budgeting or managerial economics. The present 
discussion uses the present value approach. The rule for 
rational decision making is to maximize the discounted con-
tribution that future net revenues make to fixed costs and 
profits, which means maximization of present value. 
The application of the model described so far involves 
several complications, some of which are peculiar to nurseries 
and similar industries. 
1. The flow of future revenues is uneven in nurseries; 
there are no revenues at the beginning. This is unlike the 
usual investment situation in manufacturing in which 
revenues or savings appear almost as soon as the equipment 
is installed. 
2. The estimates of revenues must take into account 
the complementarity of demand for nursery products. The 
offering of one plant may help "fill out" the product line and 
help sell other plants. This means that the present value of 
a plant may be greater than that indicated by its own sales. 
This problem of complementarity is found also in other 
industries, especially in retailing. 
3. Decisions on the quantity of land to be devoted to 
a particular plant must recognize price-volume relationships. 
If it requires lower prices to sell greater quantities of a plant 
material, it becomes necessary to consider the marginal 
revenues rather than the average or total revenues. The 
price-volume relationship or elasticity of demand in turn 
depends upon the market structure in which the nursery 
operates. 
One great advantage of the present value method is 
that it provides a ready comparison of plants of varying 
growing periods. To make two plants requiring different 
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growing periods comparable, it is necessary to estimate the 
present value of revenues and costs for the same length of 
time in the future on each. Here the "horizon" or planning 
period concept becomes important. As used in this chapter, 
the term "horizon," or "planning period," refers to the 
maximum growing period that a nursery considers on the 
slowest maturing plant. The model requires a projection of 
revenues and expenses on all varieties up to the full length 
of the "horizon." If the "horizon" is nine years, it is nec-
essary to consider three cycles of a plant with a three-year 
growing period to make an adequate comparison. 
Certainty model: pricing decisions 
Under the assumed conditions, the rules for pricing are 
clear cut though complicated. It should be noted at the out-
set that plant mix decisions are dependent upon the pricing 
decisions-that is, it is necessary to determine the most 
profitable price simultaneously with the most profitable mix 
of plants. The determination of the "best" price involves 
marginal principles well known in economics. A high price 
may mean low volume and thus does not guarantee the max-
imum contribution to overhead and profits. A low price 
may mean low contribution per unit that is not offset by a 
large volume. The elasticity of demand helps govern the 
determination of the best price. 
The difficulty here is the determination of the "best" 
price on one item independently from prices on others. It 
may be that the contribution to overhead and profits from 
growing ten acres of a particular type of tree selling at a 
price of $5.00 is greater than that from five acres at $6.00 or 
fifteen acres at $4.00, but this does not mean that ten acres 
of this plant should be grown. What is necessary is a com-
putation of the discounted marginal contribution per unit of 
land. The aim should be to equate the discounted marginal 
contributions from each plant variety-that is, to expand 
the production and lower the price on high contribution 
items and contract the production and raise the price on low 
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contribution items until both make the same discounted 
marginal contribution per unit of land. 
Certainty model: other decisions 
Take, for example, a problem that is quite common in 
nurseries. Five evergreens are left on a particular block of 
land.7 If they were cleared from the land, the whole block 
could be planted anew. Three alternatives are available. 
1. Let the five evergreens grow until the next season 
in the hope that they will be sold at that time. 
2. Sell the evergreens at a reduced price and plant the 
land in the new crop. 
3. Clear the evergreens from the land, making way for 
the new crop.s 
The solution would involve a comparison of three 
values: ( 1) the discounted contribution to overhead and 
profits of the five evergreens sold in the next season; ( 2) the 
revenue to be derived from a cut-price sale at the present 
(taking into account the effects of this price reduction on 
company sales in general) plus the discounted extra revenue 
to be gained from an earlier planting of the new item; and 
( 3) the discounted extra revenue from an earlier planting 
of the new item less the incremental costs of plant de-
struction. 
This illustration indicates the flexibility of the analysis 
suggested so far. The main issue before us is whether it is 
or could be feasible in practice. 
Cost considerations 
One of the main points made so far is that decision 
making in nurseries should concentrate on revenue estima-
tion rather than cost measurement. But costs are not com-
7 Under the conditions of certainty with which we started, this 
eventuality would not arise. But it is time to start relaxing the assump-
tions. 
s A nursery may select the third alternative rather than the second 
because of the chances that lower prices on some units will "spoil the 
market" on others or because of the cost and nuisance of special sales. 
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pletely irrelevant.9 Since we are interested in determining 
the contribution of revenues to the land and other fixed 
facilities of the firm, it is unnecessary to deduct any of the 
fixed or "sunk" costs from those revenues. But it is nec-
essary to take into account the incremental costs. 
One may define incremental costs several different ways 
in this situation-and indeed some flexibility in definition 
may help meet the needs of different decision-making prob-
lems. We are interested in those costs which arise from 
growing one plant rather than another. What would enter 
into such costs? Some nurserymen might be tempted to in-
clude all of the labor costs; but a substantial proportion of 
the labor costs will run on regardless of the mix of plants. 
The emphasis should be on the differences in labor costs aris-
ing from different plantings. The same would be true of the 
costs of fertilizer, sprays, extra advertising, or whatever added 
costs arise from the particular decision. 
In actual practice, difficulties may arise in estimating 
such incremental costs precisely. But there is every reason 
to believe that such estimates are easier and more relevant 
than estimates of fully allocated average costs, which depend 
upon arbitrary allocations of fixed costs. It is not necessary, 
for example, to estimate the cost of land-which is fortunate, 
since that would raise questions about whether it is "original 
cost," "replacement cost," or "market value" that is relevant. 
Significance of the present value approach 
What the present value approach to decision making 
means is this: the emphasis is on the apportionment of the 
fixed facilities (the land, the buildings, the services of top 
management, the fixed component of the labor force, and 
9 This discussion assumes that most nursery costs are fixed, so that 
only a minor fraction of the costs appears in the incremental costs. This 
is consistent with our observations in the nurseries we have visited. If 
incremental costs are a high proportion of the total, the relative stress 
we have given revenue would no longer be appropriate, especially in 
view of the fact that the costs come earlier and thus should not be dis-
counted so heavily. 
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the equipment) to various products. The objective is maxi-
mization of profits to be derived from those facilities, which 
means the selection of the optimum combination of alter-
natives. (If the objective is not maximization of profits, some 
modification of the model would be necessary.) The present 
value method discounts the expected profits in such a way 
that earnings in different time periods can be compared. 
The fixed facilities, including the land, are the scarce 
resources that must be rationed according to this model. 
The present values enable management to rank alternatives 
to optimize the use of these resources. This is not necessarily 
the only way to look at the problem. If the firm is in a tight 
cash position, management might look upon liquid funds 
rather than land as the bottleneck resource and might place 
greater stress on the early receipt of cash from sales, thus 
giving a higher priority to short-maturing plants. But the 
present value model can handle this problem. What a short-
age of cash really means is that the opportunity cost of 
capital is high.10 The higher the rate of discount, the more 
favorable the investments in early maturing plants according 
to the formula, for it discounts revenues from slow-growing 
plants more heavily. 
Removal of the simplifying assumptions 
Practical nurserymen are probably highly skeptical of 
the practicability of the model. It is remote from their ex-
perience, and the estimates and computations required go 
far beyond what most of them believe they can afford. One 
of the benefits of constructing such a model is that it brings 
out the difficulties of actual applications of theoretically 
correct methods and thus indicates the need for some kind 
of compromise. 
The next step is to remove the most unrealistic as-
sumptions, to bring the model closer to reality. 
1. We remove the assumption of a given quantity of 
10 This is a reflection of the fact that the tight cash position re-
stricts plantings to items producing high returns. 
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land. The model itself indicates when land should be pur-
chased or sold. If the present value of marginal land in 
internal uses exceeds the price of added land, expansion is 
profitable.11 If such present values are below the market 
value of the land, this suggests a contraction or perhaps a 
relocation on cheaper land. Thus the present value method 
aids longrun decisions. 
2. We drop the assumption of certainty about demand, 
revenues, and costs. The firms face several kinds of un-
certainty, among which the following are most important: 
uncertainty about the position and the elasticity of the de-
mand curves of the various products that the nursery might 
sell at various points in the future; uncertainty about the 
complementary relations among the demand schedules for 
these products (that is, uncertainty about cross elasticities); 
uncertainty about the effects of the weather and disease on 
the different lines of plants in the future; uncertainty about 
the relative proportions of fixed and variable costs, indeed 
about the shape of the cost functions over time; and uncer-
tainty about the proportion of plant materials that remain 
unsold after a period of years, resulting in uncertainty about 
the costs of clearing the land for new planting.12 
Probability analysis may be applied to all of these types 
of uncertainty. On the basis of past experience and future 
forecasts, management can make estimates of the dimensions 
of the probability distributions of demands and costs. It is 
then possible to apply the present value formula, the analysis 
being complicated by the fact that the estimates are proba-
bility distributions rather than exact estimates of costs and 
revenues. 
The computation of these probabilities is likely to be 
11 For this purpose it may be desirable to lengthen the "horizon" 
to include a longer period of years. Otherwise the present value is 
understated. 
12 In other industries the present value of an investment frequently 
includes the discounted "salvage value" of the equipment at the end 
of its life. In nurseries the salvage value is frequently negative-it costs 
money to destroy the plants that remain in the ground. 
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laborious and costly. Even in theory there may be doubt 
that probability analysis is applicable. If the future is unlike 
any prospects that this firm or any other firm in the past has 
ever met, where does one get the information to determine 
the shapes and positions of the probability distributions? 
One may doubt that even a large nursery with a great volume 
of sales of each plant material could profit much from re-
fined statistical analysis; and the smaller the nursery, the 
more doubtful the practice. Thus we have encountered a 
serious obstacle t9 the application of the model to the real-
ities of business life. 
CONCLUSIONS: ECONOMICS AND 
ACCOUNTING IN NURSERY DECISIONS 
This chapter has considered two approaches to decision 
making: an accounting approach which follows the tradition 
of building up costs including allocations of overhead; and 
the approach of economics, which starts with revenue esti-
mates, makes adjustments for incremental costs, and applies 
the discounting principle. A study of actual cases and of 
the literature indicates that neither approach has won wide 
popularity in the industry. 
The simplicity of the accounting approach explains why 
some firms and writers have taken an interest in developing 
cost finding or cost accounting for nurseries. But we have 
shown that both conceptual and practical difficulties stand 
in the way of this development. Perhaps cost accounting 
can contribute to control; but measures of full cost have 
little to contribute to decision making. 
The economic model we have constructed also has 
serious limitations. If applied formally, it takes on a mathe-
matical form, since it requires the simultaneous consideration 
of a large number of variables. Its full application might re-
quire an electronic computer. The variables fitted into this 
model must be subjective estimates of future events, in-
cluding forecasts of demand. Even the determination of 
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the appropriate discount rate requires something close to a 
guess. The economic model is a refined technique for dealing 
with highly conjectural data. 
Is there anything practical a nurseryman can gain from 
this discussion? Perhaps the analysis in this chapter will 
give him greater confidence that his failure to use cost ac-
counting is no great loss. He may learn from the economic 
model despite its complexity. It points up the factors that 
should influence decisions. In fact, many nurserymen un-
trained in economics are undoubtedly approximating the 
kind of analysis called for by this model. 
A recent article for nurserymen supports the view pre-
sented here: "The best thing for them [nurserymen] to do 
is make some guesses on what can be sold, plant these se-
lections, do the best possible job of production, do all pos-
sible to keep expenses down, and when the crop is ready, do 
all within reason to sell it at the highest possible price .... 
A nurseryman is far better qualified to set prices if he is 
thoroughly acquainted with the year's ... production, mar-
ket demands, carry-over, ... general business conditions and 
similar contingencies that joggle demands up and down. In 
fact cost figures might have the effect of leading him to price 
his trees much below or much above what he should and 
thus he may realize far less than he would have without this 
cost knowledge."13 
The theory presented in this chapter is useful in spite of 
the inadequacies of the data available in practice. A full 
recognition of the role of discounting, of the importance of 
demand and competition, and of the significance of incre-
mental costs should lead to better decision making. Nursery-
men will continue to make subjective estimates of these 
variables, but those familiar with the theory are more likely 
to make relevant estimates. 
13 Billerbeck, Amer. Nurseryman, CX, 62. This same writer favors 
special cost analyses and controls to serve particular purposes. For ex-
ample, he samples time cards on certain operations and uses these for 
control. But apparently he is quite careful to avoid letting his cost 
estimates have an undue influence on his decisions. 
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3 
RETAIL STORES 
[JN CONDUCTING his business each retailer has prob-
lems that are unique to the operation of his own firm, and 
retailing deals with a diverse array of products, each requiring 
slightly different handling by management.l Yet there are 
kinds of decisions common to the whole area. Typical of 
important decisions for successful retailing are: determination 
of what and how much to buy; pricing; establishment or 
abandonment of merchandise lines; total promotional effort; 
and allocation of promotional effort. Questions of buying 
and pricing are probably the most fundamental decisions 
which the retailer must make, and therefore they form the 
center of this chapter. 
SOME GENERALIZATIONS 
Six general statements summarize the central findings from 
the case studies, but do not displace the fuller discussion of 
particular cases in the later part of this chapter. 
1. The stores covered by this study accumulate ac-
counting data primarily to satisfy governmental regulations 
and to maintain some semblance of financial control. Small 
stores do not emphasize decision making as a purpose of their 
accounting systems; larger stores sometimes make decisions 
on the basis of data secured for one of the two principal 
purposes. 
2. The concept of homeostasis describes the usual role 
of accounting in retail decision making. This statement is 
made with some reservation because small retailers are in 
such close contact with their business that accounting re-
ports merely confirm their impressions. The homeostatic 
function of accounting is more pronounced in large stores 
where decision-making authority is delegated. 
3. Small retailers use sales data as a first approximation 
of future demand, though only in combination with other 
information. The final estimate of future demand is con-
ditioned by the retailer's own judgment, employee sug-
gestions, etc. 
4. Budgeting is evident in some form in all firms. The 
extent to which the budget is formalized varies widely. 
5. Accounting is not used by the stores covered in this 
study as a source of programed incremental cost data. When 
decisions require cost data, the merchants make ad hoc 
studies of anticipated costs. 
6. Particular attention is given to suppliers' "estimated 
profitability" studies. This practice indicates that the store 
managements consider such studies relevant for merchan-
dising decisions. It raises the question of why the same re-
tailers do not make studies of their own. 
1 The case studies for this chapter cover men's clothing, gift, drug, 
book, hardware, department, and departmentalized specialty stores. 
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THE CONCEPT OF HOMEOSTASIS 
AND RET AIL DECISION MAKING 
Accounting can operate in the homeostasis process as ( 1) the 
receptor of changing conditions, ( 2) the translator of con-
ditions into financial data, and ( 3) the relayer of data to 
the organization. But the extent to which these functions 
are performed depends upon the degree of refinement at-
tained by the accounting system and the focus of manage-
ment's attention. 
Retailers stress the development of various financial and 
operating ratios. Trade associations by accumulating and 
publishing the operating results of retail stores encourage 
the practice. Store managers are in a position to compare 
their operating results with those of other stores; but, in 
order to use the information, managers must develop their 
own ratios. Two cases illustrate the wide variation in small 
retailer use of comparative data. 
Edward's Men's Shop is located in a medium-size industrial 
city. The owner and one other salesman are the only personnel. 
The accounting system is very crude, and reports are prepared 
once a year for tax purposes. Ratios and averages are not prepared 
because the owner sees no need for them nor does he under-
stand their meaning. He receives publications of industry data, 
but does not use the information. 
In this case the concept of homeostasis may seem inap-
plicable because data are not developed to reveal changing 
relationships in the financial statements. However, the 
owner gauges his success by his ability to maintain an ade-
quate living. If a cash stringency develops, his first reaction 
is to embark on a campaign which would ease the situation, 
e.g., drastic markdowns and increased advertising. The 
owner's demand for cash shifts over time. The Edwards case 
illustrates the homeostatic nature of decisions and indicates 
that accounting data are not necessary for the process to 
operate. 
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Gravett's is the largest men's clothing firm in a college city. 
This and several other stores contribute semiannual operating 
results to a central office which computes certain ratios and 
averages from the data. The contributing stores receive a report 
of the combined results. Store officials are stimulated to correct 
deficiencies revealed by the report. 
This store maintains an elaborate accounting system ( ma-
chine accounting makes possible perpetual inventory con-
trol), but there are no departmental reports even though the 
outlet is departmentalized for buying purposes. With ma-
chine accounting, day-by-day figures are available on sales 
and merchandise costs. The data are translated into average 
markups by related categories of items. The computation 
of these markups may raise doubts about management's 
statement that little attention is given to average markups. 
Retailers are often more concerned with individual fi-
nancial statement items than with relationships among items. 
Martin's Men's Store was purchased in bankruptcy by a former 
employee of a national retail chain. The owner gave up a good 
salary to operate it. An extensive advertising campaign was 
undertaken to increase profits to a "satisfactory level." In three 
years, sales were doubled, and the owner was satisfied with 
profits. Subsequently, advertising expenditures were reduced 
because the objective was reached. 
Profit is the concern of the owner, and in this case, profit is 
measured by accounting reports. Throughout the three years, 
operating statements were prepared biannually and the profit 
figure was consciously compared with the decision maker's 
profit objective. 
The rationality of curtailing successful advertising is 
subject to question. But there are two possible interpre-
tations: ( l ) the decision maker assumes that once the desired 
level of profit is reached, less advertising is necessary to 
maintain the captured market and the profit, or (2) he 
estimates that the advertising expense would exceed the 
incremental profits from advertising. Neither interpretation 
fits the actual situation: the owner having reached his goal 
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cut back the advertising campaign without further thought. 
Throughout the three-year period, the owner regularly re-
ceived reports of national data which, when compared with 
the firm's ratio of advertising to sales, showed the latter the 
higher. But to the owner this fact was secondary as long as 
profits were unsatisfactory. Once the profit goal was attained, 
advertising was budgeted at the national average. 
To summarize, the stimuli for decision making vary from 
store to store. ( 1) In some stores formal accounting data do 
not appear in the homeostatic process. This is true in very 
small stores in which the accounting systems are quite crude. 
The owners are more concerned with cash than with "profit." 
( 2) In larger stores, a great deal of time and effort is spent 
to compute and record ratios. The amount of effort is not 
always an indication of the importance of the data; in some 
cases, no uses of such information are cited, even though 
the statistics are available. ( 3) Although the homeostatic 
concept may suggest stress on ratios, the case studies indicate 
greater attention to absolutes. The firms are concerned with 
the amounts of cash, of salaries, or of profits. 
HISTORICAL DATA AS 
ESTIMATES OF FUTURE DATA 
Historical data are used as first approximations of expec-
tations, depending on the type of retailer. In the case 
studies, accounting data are frequently used in forecasts of 
demand. Merchandise decisions may rest on such estimates, 
but the final decision is influenced by a number of consider-
ations which reduce the impact of accounting data. 
Why historical data are used in some retail stores 
Some stores use historical data in estimating future re-
quirements, especially in the case of shopping goods with 
relatively stable demand. Such merchandise is usually han-
dled by the smaller, more specialized retailer. For example, 
the small retailers of men's clothing state that data for the 
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past are valid approximations of future sales. These retailers 
find that demand for their merchandise shifts very little over 
time. 
Borons Men's Shop carries an exclusive line of merchandise, and 
patrons of the store are mainly from the high-income bracket. 
For seasonal merchandising decisions, previous season's sales 
data are consulted and orders are placed which differ little from 
those of the preceding season. It is significant that this retailer 
classifies sales by individual items, even though managements 
of stores with similar merchandise do not. 
Using past data in decision making may appear to be in-
consistent with managerial economics which emphasizes 
orientation to the future. The focus on past data is ap-
propriate if there is a close relationship between past and 
future volume. Accounting systems can provide information 
on past sales and sales returns of individual or related mer-
chandise. Other internal sources of information include 
customer and sales people suggestions. External sources of 
information for anticipating demand include buying office 
circulars, trade papers, newspapers, and market surveys.2 
Accounting systems as sources of historical data 
The accounting systems are rarely designed to develop 
relevant data explicitly for internal decision making. On the 
contrary, the systems exist to provide data for external parties 
(mainly government agencies) and for financial control. In 
only a few stores is management able to consult accounting 
records for information on the purchases and sales of indi-
vidual items. Periodic inventory counts, usually taken pre-
ceding a buying trip or before placing an order, provide facts 
if the records disclose purchases of individual items. 
Unger Men's Store keeps no records of purchases. When placing 
an order, the owner obtains information on previous purchases 
from the supplier. 
2 Delbert J. Duncan and Charles F. Phillips, Retailing: Principles 
and Methods (5th ed.; Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1959), 
p. 248. 
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The manager of Unger's stated that more information re-
lating to styles, colors, sizes, dates of sale, subsequent mark-
downs, etc., is desirable. But he does not collect such data. 
He regards the cost of doing so as prohibitive. 
Another men's clothing store maintains simple, but 
complete, records on sales and purchases of individual items 
in its stock. The manager was quite emphatic in stating that 
his system was adequate for his needs and that his experience 
showed demand for the store's merchandise was stable. 
To summarize: in some retail stores data regarding the 
past are a useful (but partial) indication of future demand; 
but the accounting systems in these stores do not usually 
develop the pertinent information systematically, if at all. 
THE MERCHANDISE BUDGET 
The merchandise budget is of concern only as it helps answer 
the question: what effect does budgeting have on merchan-
dising decisions? The discussion throws light on three issues; 
( 1) what the merchandise budget is; ( 2) how the budget is 
used in small firms; and ( 3) how it affects merchandising 
decisions. 
The merchandise budget defined 
Buying decisions consist of determining what to buy, 
how much to buy, when to buy, and from whom to buy. The 
merchandise budget does not resolve these issues, but it 
does provide a framework for planning purchases. Specif-
ically, a merchandise budget is the formal, or informal, al-
location of available funds among various competing in-
ventory items. It is not a budget of costs and revenues; only 
wholesale costs are included in the merchandise budget. It 
may cover a three- to six-month period, or longer, depending 
upon the store's characteristics. 
The budget and the small retailer 
The allocations in the case studies are in terms of units, 
of dollars, or of both. When it is in terms of dollars (the 
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predominant practice), the retailer attempts to maximize the 
gross margin on the sale of all items. Since price lines are 
usually firmly established in small retail stores, the emphasis 
is on "economic" buying. The objective is to buy merchan-
dise of suitable quality to fit into the price range and at a 
wholesale cost which makes a satisfactory margin feasible. 
Unit budgeting is the rule in instances of prepriced, nation-
ally advertised lines. In this situation, the retailer is con-
cerned only with estimating the amount to sell at the 
established price. 
Budgeting in small retail stores varies in several re-
spects. In very small owner-manager firms, the process is 
very informal and subjective. For example, the owner de-
termines the amount of available funds and then, from past 
records tempered by his own judgment, allocates funds 
among the various items. Other retailers buy as the occasion 
arises without preliminary planning. 
In larger stores the process of budgeting is more formal-
ized. If the buying function is delegated to other employees, 
the budgeting process is a means of controlling the expendi-
tures of any single buyer. The Richardson case illustrates 
this point. 
Richardson's Department Store is a successful operation in a 
large city. Although annual sales are in excess of $2 million, 
it is independently owned and is not dominant in the city. The 
merchandising manager allows each buyer to make up his buying 
plan (budget) for a coming season. Each buyer's budget is then 
compared with the master plan. If critical differences appear, 
the buyer and merchandising manager discuss the reasons and 
reach agreement. Once a plan is accepted, the buyer takes 
full responsibility for the operation of his department. 
In this store, budgeting is a tool for administrative control-
not merely for financial control. Smaller stores do not extend 
the budget beyond provision of a buying guide. 
Its effect on merchandising decisions 
It is difficult in small stores to distinguish budgeting 
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from the whole process of merchandising decisions. But one 
thing is clear: in those stores in which lines of merchandise 
are stable, the budgeting process is the merchandising de-
cision. In such stores little effort is made to experiment with 
price or with new merchandise; the budget incorporates the 
expedient decision. 
The budget can be a restraint on buying. It establishes 
the initial number (or value) of items to be purchased, but 
the retailer may leave a 10 percent to 30 percent "open to 
buy" margin in each category. During the season, reorders 
are made until the "open to buy" provision is nil. If mer-
chandise is purchased beyond this limit, the retailer "over-
buys." With certain exceptions, retailers do not reorder an 
item that is "100 percent bought." 
The function of the budget, or merchandising plan, 
varies among stores. In a department store, the manager 
considers it an invaluable control device. In a small shop, 
the owner uses the budget to indicate where money is spent. 
AD HOC ANALYSIS 
Small retailers seldom prepare quantitative ad hoc analyses 
for merchandising decisions. The owner-managers of small 
shoe shops, men's clothing stores, etc., consider costs other 
than merchandise costs fixed for the time period involved in 
merchandise decisions. Price lines are firmly established. 
Baker's Men's Shop is located in a college city and is in direct 
competition with a "better merchandise" departmentalized 
specialty store. In addition to the owner, there are two other 
employees, both of whom have been with the firm for fifteen 
years. Advertising is budgeted at a fixed amount; alterations 
are made for a fixed monthly fee by a local seamstress; receiving, 
handling, and marking are done by the two employees. The 
only cost that the owner can control is merchandise cost. Price 
lines are maintained at a level consistent with the store's repu-
tation for quality goods. The fixity of costs and price lines do 
not permit shortrun price-volume experiments. 
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The manager of a departmentalized specialty store prepares 
special cost studies for some merchandise decisions. The 
usual objects of these studies are new items and large pur-
chases requiring heavy inventory costs.3 
Black's, a departmentalized specialty store, is located in a large 
southern city. The manager developed ad hoc incremental cost 
data for an item-hand-blown glassware-that is new in the 
city. The analysis indicated that incremental delivery costs would 
be 25 cents per set. The manager informed the employees that 
a bonus of 15 cents per set would be paid on every sale which 
resulted in the consumer carrying the glassware out of the 
store; such a bonus would be less than the savings in incremental 
cost. 
The manager also used the analysis to establish a price on 
the glassware lower than in other regions. He recognizes 
that the lower price can result in a total net dollar contribu-
tion greater than that from higher unit prices. The manager 
indicates that he has chosen a "penetration" instead of a 
"skimming" price. Lowering prices to attract volume is not 
an unusual practice in departmentalized stores; but support-
ing the decision with a quantified analysis is unusual. 
Merchandise decisions of store managers are sometimes 
influenced by "projected estimates of profitability" analyses. 
Studies of this type are prepared by suppliers of merchandise 
new to the store. The analyses are based on external infor-
mation-experiences of similar stores, for example-and 
seldom rely on internal data. 
Accounting data are developed for management in some 
departmentalized operations. But there is no strong evidence 
which indicates that such data are important in the examina-
tions of alternatives. 
Janet Lea's Department Store maintains an accounting system 
that develops operating statements for each of 50 departments. 
The departmental statements are based on the "contribution 
plan accounting" method which assigns "direct costs" to the 
3 This practice is consistent with that suggested by McNair and 
May, Harv. Bus. Rev., XXXV, 105-22. 
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departments. The profitability of departments is gauged by their 
"contribution" to unassigned indirect costs. Management uses 
these statements for control; decisions involving departmental 
changes are not based directly on these reports. 
The management of Janet Lea's indicates that decisions to 
add two large departments were based on analyses prepared 
by manufacturers of the new merchandise. A decision to re-
locate a department was based on management's subjective 
analysis of the situation which extended over several weeks. 
The merchandise manager stated that monthly statements 
had indicated that the department was not doing as well as 
desired. Yet he did not objectively determine the opportun-
ity costs of continued operations. His time was consumed by 
the routine of retail selling. After several weeks of "mulling 
it over," he decided to move the department to a new 
location. 
The manner in which the management decided to re-
locate the department is not unusual. Subjective analyses 
are often substituted for quantified analyses because of time 
pressures and the absence of suitable data. The "contribution 
plan accounting" method is used in the store, but the ac-
counting reports serve decision making only by indicating 
troublesome departments. A question of relocating a de-
partment requires other kinds of data. Specifically, the net 
incremental revenue from an alternative line of merchan-
dise constitutes the opportunity cost of failure to move a 
department. Accounting methods cannot develop oppor-
tunity cost data; they can indicate the net incremental 
revenue of the present merchandise line. 
THE CASE STUDIES IN TERMS OF 
RATIONAL DECISION MAKING 
The actual uses of accounting described in this chapter can 
be evaluated in terms of a model for rational decision making. 
This section does not construct a full mathematical model, 
but it indicates the principal variables and relationships that 
50 
would be incorporated in such a modeJ.4 The analysis is 
developed briefly with no attempt to supply the magnitudes 
of the relationships-it is general and applies to all types of 
retailers. The discussion is accordingly truistic: it outlines a 
self-evident pattern of logic. The question is how retailers 
can and do apply the logic in a world of change and un-
certainty. 
Elements of a prescriptive model 
A model for rational retailing decisions would consist 
of the following elements: 
l. Recognition of the need for simultaneous decisions: 
decisions on product lines, on prices, on advertising and other 
efforts to differentiate the product, and on the allocation of 
floor space. The optimum value of any one of these variables 
depends upon the position of the others. In addition, there 
are related longrun decisions on expansion and contraction 
of store space, modernization of the store, and so on. Ob-
viously the simultaneous solution of all the relevant equations 
is complex, even ignoring problems of uncertainty. 
2. Incorporation of the four economic principles of 
rational decision making. Of these, the discounting principle 
is least important; pricing, product line, and floor space al-
location decisions do not involve sufficient commitments 
over a period of time to make discounting future revenues 
important. A rational model must incorporate the other 
three principles-the incremental principle, the time per-
spective principle, and the opportunity cost principle. ( l) 
The marginal costs and marginal revenues of each com-
modity, for all relevant prices and sales efforts, must be con-
sidered. This involves estimates of demand elasticities for 
all commodities, no easy task when hundreds or thousands 
of items are involved. (2) The impact of today's decisions 
on the "store image" and the future customer goodwill must 
4 For a more complete mathematical treatment see Bob R. Hol-
dren, The Structure of a Retail Market and the Market Behavior of 
Retail Units (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1960). 
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be evaluated. ( 3) The outcomes of all alternative uses of 
the same space, the same funds and the same personnel must 
be compared. 
Other details add to the complexity of retailing de-
cisions: 
I. There are complementary relations in demand. A 
change in price or selling effort on one item has repercussions 
on the sales of others. 
2. There is the problem of optimum allocation of floor 
space. Two factors bearing upon this problem are the lo-
cation of items in relation to the flow of consumer traffic 
and the quantity of each item to have in current stock. In 
the allocation of space, retailing has great shortrun flexibility 
as compared, for example, with manufacturing or with plant 
nurseries. 
3. There must be attention to the rate of stock turn-
over, an important variable for determining the contribution 
to the profit of each item; the longer an item stays on the 
shelves, the less profitable the use of space. The fact that 
turnover is related to location in the store and to the quan-
tity of the particular item on display stands in the way of a 
simple solution. 
4. There must be an estimation of future markdowns 
on each item, a serious problem for seasonal and fashion 
goods. 
5. There must be a weighing of sales effort for the 
store as a whole against effort on individual items. Store-
wide advertising, for example, must be weighed against ad-
vertising particular departments or commodities. 
6. There must be attention to the availability of work-
ing capital. A shortage of current funds requires greater 
stress on low investment and high turnover items; sometimes 
it stimulates markdowns or more active selling efforts. 
Many of these considerations are oriented to the market. 
But optimum retail decisions must also consider costs, in-
cremental costs being the most relevant. For some retailers 
the cost of goods sold may provide a close approximation of 
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incremental costs. Retail decisions may also involve dif-
ferentials in inward transportation, handling, delivery, credit, 
buying, special advertising, and display expenses, and so on. 
One of the new developments in large-scale retailing is 
a specialized accounting system, such as merchandising man-
agement accounting, to determine those costs and to allocate 
them on an incremental basis. 
The case studies evaluated 
The suggested model indicates that a retailer must con-
sider a great number of uncertain factors whenever a de-
cision of consequence is made. No doubt most small re-
tailers recognize the importance of these factors; they also 
recognize the difficulties of estimating the relevant equations, 
whether quantitative or qualitative, and solving them simul-
taneously. To simplify the analysis, small retailers pay par-
ticular attention to only a few of the major variables. 
Retailers use shortcuts, simplifications, and rules of 
thumb because of the complexity of the real world; but 
there is no reason for accepting their actual behavior as the 
optimum behavior. Indeed, the attention given to a few 
well-defined variables such as cash, "profit," and gross mar-
gins may lead to neglect of less definable but important 
variables. For example, the retailer who is concerned with 
the maintenance of liquidity (cash) may ignore the longer 
run implications of "quick sales" and "closeouts." Infor-
mation is scarce and frequently uncertain, but the most 
satisfactory decisions cannot be reached by "happily ignor-
ing" pertinent aspects of a problem. 
No doubt, the retail budget based on extrapolation of 
past sales data is a convenient method for dealing with 
merchandising decisions. In fact, many small retailers re-
duce buying decisions to a routine by stocking established 
merchandise with fixed price lines. The relatively unchanging 
merchandise mix enables the retailers to rely heavily on 
analyses born of experience, supported in some stores by 
historical data. Thus, the retailer reduces the amount of at-
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tention to complementary demand relationships, floor space 
allocations, and product differentiation effort. Retailers use 
merchandise budgets to implement planned buying with 
stress on simplicity. And there is every reason to accept the 
practice as sound. However, retailers may find that their 
budgets become crutches which, slavishly used, cripple the 
user. The misuse of budgets is illustrated by the failure to 
reorder because a category is "bought." Conditions change, 
and the forecast of demand prepared for the budget may be 
inappropriate at a later period. 
Accounting also involves considerable simplification 
from the complexities of a complete theoretical model. 
Usually retail accounting quite correctly avoids the arbitrary 
and irrelevant overhead allocations found in manufacturing. 
But retail accounting in small firms also overlooks some in-
cremental costs needed for decisions. The question is 
whether small firms would benefit from programed incre-
mental analyses; this involves a comparison of benefits and 
costs. Most small retailers have never heard of incremental 
accounting methods; others who know something about 
such methods consider them too costly. Yet they spend 
money for accounting data which they admit are not used 
for decisions but are used for control. 
Ad hoc cost analyses permit the flexible consideration of 
factors relevant for particular decisions without the expense 
of special programing. In actual practice small businessmen 
come closer to the rational decision-making model in their 
ad hoc analyses, because they are then not bound by the 
conventions of budgeting and accounting. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE 
The preceding discussion suggests the following implications 
for accounting practice: 
1. Small retailers with few changes in the accounting 
system can use accounting data in forecasting, especially for 
items with stable demands. More complete information on 
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individual items would be required-for example, detailed 
breakdowns on volume, prices, cost of goods sold, and price 
revisions. The small retailer must determine the items with 
sufficiently stable sales to justify projection. 
2. Elaborate incremental systems, such as merchandise 
management accounting, are too costly for small store use, 
though these stores can advantageously use incremental 
concepts in merchandising decisions. Small retailers may well 
attempt to estimate the incremental cost of stocking, espe-
cially if the item is one not previously handled or one which 
requires an unusually large investment. 
3. Quantitative ad hoc analyses can be prepared for any 
decision. Such analyses require subjective judgment about 
key relationships. Actual pencil-and-paper computations en-
courage more systematic evaluations of decision alternatives. 
4. Of the accounting systems currently used in retailing, 
net income departmental reporting is the least satisfactory for 
decision-making purposes because of its reliance on arbitrary 
allocations. Contribution plan accounting avoids most of 
those allocations but uses a cost concept (direct cost) which 
has no necessary relation to variable cost or incremental 
cost; direct costs in this system refer to zones of responsibility 
rather than to cost-volume relationships. Some simple form 
of "marginal income analysis" would be preferable to the 
usual systems, for it would focus attention on costs affected 
by decisions. 
That small retailers simplify their analysis in making 
decisions is understandable; the practical world of business is 
too complex and uncertain to permit the exact application 
of refined theory. The need is for a compromise between 
mechanical uses of conventional approaches and flexible 
evaluations for individual problems. Accounting will con-
tinue to play a part in small retailers' decisions, but there is 
room for experimentation with new methods that meet the 
needs of decision making more directly. 
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4 
MANUFACTURING FIRMS 
SMALL MAl'\lUFACTURING firms make three impor-
tant classes of decisions which are considered in this chapter: 
( 1) product diversification, ( 2) investment, and ( 3) pricing. 
These firms represent a variety of types: special order and 
continuous production, single and multiple products, keen 
competition and local monopoly. The central interest of 
this discussion is the kinds of accounting data that manage-
ments use for the analysis of the three types of decisions. 
SOME GENERALIZATIONS 
The following generalizations apply to accounting and de-
cision making in manufacturing. 
I. There is little evidence that accounting data are im-
portant to product diversification decisions of firms included 
in this study. The uncertainties of such decisions, e.g., op-
portunity costs, demand, and reactions of competitors, are 
not resolved by accounting data. 
2. Investment decisions are based primarily on sub-
jective evaluations, although cost estimates support the 
analysis on occasion. The firms have programed accounting 
data for use in recurring replacement decisions, but the 
programed data are of questionable value. 
3. Neither special-order nor continuous-process manu-
facturers covered by the study use formal job order or process 
cost accounting. Data from the financial accounts are used 
to construct special cost studies. 
4. Product cost estimates invariably include some pro-
vision for overhead. However, many managements, though 
not familiar with all the refinements of incremental reason-
ing, make decisions at least partially consistent with marginal 
analysis. 
5. Finally, the status of accounting in pricing decisions 
is heavily dependent upon market structures within which 
firms operate. Some market conditions encourage the use of 
costs as determined by accounting (full costs in the specific 
firms studied). Other market conditions stimulate flexible 
adjustment of prices to demand. 
PRODUCT DIVERSIFICATION 
DECISIONS OF TWO FIRMS 
Product-line decisions, especially those to manufacture new 
products, are crucial. Such decisions commit the firm to a 
long-range course of action and usually require an invest-
ment in fixed facilities. In this section we concentrate on 
the decisions of two firms to manufacture a new product. 
Lake Concrete Products' immediate competitor sold his firm 
in December, 19 59. The new owner of the competing firm 
manufactured concrete burial vaults (the sole producer in the 
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area) in another plant. Mr. Lake anticipated that this situation 
could lead to price cutting. He expected that the new man-
agement would shade prices on concrete blocks because of the 
cushion afforded by monopoly profits in burial vaults. Price war-
fare could only result in lost volume for Lake. He would not 
retaliate in kind for two reasons: he objected strongly to price 
shading on ethical grounds, and he was not sure that volume 
would increase as a result. The need for action became more 
pronounced when the competing firm published a lowered 
price schedule to be effective in the spring of 1960. 
Mr. Lake considered two alternatives: to manufacture 
burial vaults or to manufacture septic tanks. His first inclination 
was to investigate burial vaults. Once he took this approach, 
he gave no subsequent thought to septic tanks, because the 
evaluation of burial vaults was encouraging. 
Mr. Lake chose the prevailing price ( $7 5.00) established 
by the monopolist, because he reasoned the competitor would 
not risk price wars on two fronts. He polled funeral parlor 
directors on the possible sales of a new vault. They assured him 
that a new vault would have a market. 
The cost calculation assumed the following form: 
Materials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $ 5.00 
Labor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15.00 
$20.00 
Overhead was not included in the calculation because Mr. Lake 
recognized that it was irrelevant to this decision. Yet he in-
cluded direct labor in the estimate even though there was idle 
labor time in the plant. Subjectively, he recognized that a large 
part of the labor cost was not incremental. The cost calculation 
therefore reflected only part of his reasoning about costs; it 
recognized the fixity of overhead but not the fixity of labor cost. 
Thus the subjective estimate of costs rather than the cost cal-
culation influenced the decision. 
Information for the cost calculation was gathered externally; 
the owner had no previous experience in manufacturing con-
crete products requiring such large quantities of material. 
The manufacturer of the molds was the primary source of 
cost data; demand estimates were obtained from the buyers. 
Internal sales records revealed information on products 
selling to an altogether different market; obviously, they 
could not supply information on a product not yet sold. 
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Case Concrete Products was stimulated to decision making by 
the desire of the owner's son to quit college and become an 
active partner in the firm. Once it was definitely decided that 
the son would become a partner, Mr. Case was prompted to 
consider alternative means of increasing profits. Present profits 
were not sufficient to allow a "reasonable" salary for both men. 
Mr. Case got information from various sources; for ex-
ample, plumbers mentioned that a new line of septic tanks 
would sell and he saw for himself the amount of building in 
areas off the sewer lines. In addition to this information, he 
knew that an expanding market for septic tanks was being 
supplied by only one producer. At no single time did he attempt 
to determine all the alternatives that might increase profits, 
nor did he actively search for information. Rather, the infor-
mation about one alternative (to manufacture septic tanks) 
seems to have searched for him.1 
If the information had been received at any time other 
than when his son desired a part in the firm, it is doubtful 
that Mr. Case would have recognized its potentiality. At that 
particular moment, he was receptive to this kind of information 
and was persuaded by it to produce septic tanks. 
The sole producer had an established price of $65.00. Mr. 
Case did not know exactly what reaction to expect from the 
monopolist, but he thought it was reasonable to expect no 
reaction. On this basis, he established his own price at $65.00. 
His estimate of cost was: 
Materials ................................... . 
Labor ......................................... . 
Overhead .................................. . 
$26.85 
9.00 
3.60 
$39.45 
The materials cost estimate was precise: it was based on the 
owner's previous experience with concrete and the requirements 
of the Board of Health. Labor cost was based on estimates of 
man-hours required to pour and strip each septic tank. Over-
head was applied at the standard rate of 10 percent of prime 
costs. The calculation represented an estimate of the full costs 
of a septic tank. 
1 Cyert, et al., suggest a "mating theory of search" to explain the 
way proposals are brought to management's attention. See Richard M. 
Cyert, W. R. Dill, and James G. March, "The Role of Expectations 
in Business Decisions," Administrative Science Quarterly, III (Dec., 
1958), 338. 
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Several significant observations can be made concerning the 
cost estimate. First, Mr. Case recognized that labor was fixed, 
since the tank was to be manufactured with excess capacity. 
He also recognized that the overhead was fixed (except for 
a small amount of user cost of the molds). Thus, net in-
cremental revenue for each tank was actually about $38.15 
per tank, although not actually calculated. However, he 
anticipated that a great deal of profit could be realized at 
the price of $65.00. 
A second observation is that the cost analysis was made 
after the decision to manufacture septic tanks. It appears 
that the calculation simply verified certain previously con-
ceived notions of the relationship between costs and pro-
duction of septic tanks. There is doubt that the calculation 
was important in making the decision. 
There are similarities between the decision-making pro-
cesses of both firms: ( l ) both decisions involved a new ac-
tivity; ( 2) in both firms the decision-making processes were 
stimulated by external events; ( 3) the analyses were in-
fluenced by information that was available and relevant to 
one alternative; and ( 4) quantifications of the analyses oc-
curred after the courses of action had been selected and 
actually played only a small part in the decisions. 
Significantly, accounting data were not used at any 
crucial phase in the decisions to establish new product lines. 
Accounting data, however, result from systems designed to 
handle an already established production scheme and, there-
fore, cannot furnish pertinent data regarding any radical 
departure from that scheme.2 When striking out on a new 
path, the decision maker must rely on external sources for 
information. 
2 Case Concrete Products manufactured burial vaults and mis-
cellaneous concrete products prior to the decision. The decision in-
volved a product that was subject to entirely different demand char-
acteristics but somewhat similar cost characteristics. Lake Concrete 
Products likewise was geared to produce for one type of market (con-
struction) whereas burial vaults involved different demand and cost 
characteristics. 
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INVESTMENT DECISIONS OF TWO FIRMS 
The role of accounting in investment decisions is to provide 
data which ( 1) indicate the need for a decision, ( 2) are 
useful for comparative analyses, and ( 3) check the accuracy 
of estimates so that future decisions can benefit from past 
errors. The decisions discussed in the foregoing section, 
which in a sense are investment decisions as well as product 
diversification decisions, indicate that some small firms do 
not use accounting data for all three purposes. Indeed, only 
in rare circumstances is it possible for a firm to program the 
data which are necessary to fulfill all the requirements for 
decision making. 
Some firms anticipate regularly recurring investment de-
cisions and therefore accumulate data specifically for such 
decisions. 
Ro-Na-Readi-Mix Concrete maintains cost records for each truck 
in its fleet. These records include the costs of maintenance, re-
pairs, gas, oil, grease, etc., and are bases for control reports. 
Management stated that the records are useful for replacement 
decisions in that trucks becoming overly expensive to operate 
are brought to the attention of management. But the cost records 
are not important in actual replacement decisions; management 
indicated that the firm's financial condition and prospects for 
the future are the important determinants. 
Three other ready-mixed concrete firms included in this 
study accumulate cost data on individual trucks. However, 
trucks are seldom replaced solely on the basis of the pro-
gramed data. More important to the firms are financial con-
siderations: a fully equipped concrete delivery truck costs 
approximately $16,000, a sizable expenditure. The cost 
records provide some means for effecting cost control, but 
they are not useful for comparing alternatives. 
These companies probably would not benefit from great 
refinement in replacement analyses. Smith's intensive study 
of a large trucking firm indicates that truck replacement de-
cisions are not improved significantly by decision rules based 
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on the optimum replacement time.3 Smith states that 
"trucking firms, and perhaps business firms generally, are 
not likely to follow replaceme\J.t policies that deviate seriously 
from optimal policies."4 The ready-mixed concrete producers 
do not replace trucks according to inflexible decision rules. 
In fact, the criterion of postponability (delaying consid-
eration of less urgent decisions) which governs truck re-
placements may produce results as economical as would 
more refined analysis. 
Some replacement decisions instead of being repetitive 
occur but few times in the life of a firm. 
A Clay Refractory mines a special clay which is processed and 
sold to firebrick manufacturers. A large scoop shovel, used to 
mine the clay, had incurred extensive repairs resulting in costly 
delays. A supplier was contacted and an analysis was made of 
a proposed replacement costing $50,000. Assuming that the 
analysis was correct, the new equipment would reduce mining 
costs by twenty cents per ton and would pay out in four years. 
The cost estimates used in the comparative cost study were 
based on information supplied by the manufacturer and by 
the financial accounts. The manufacturer estimated operat-
ing results based on other users' experience and on engineer-
ing studies; the refractory management made estimates of 
costs that would be incurred if the old shovel were kept. 
Management recognized that the book value of the present 
shovel was no indication of its current value. Some cost 
data supplied by the accounts were relevant, e.g., repair and 
maintenance cost, whereas others were not, e.g., depreciation. 
Management accepted the relevant costs and rejected the ir-
relevant. 
The experiences of these two firms indicate that ( 1) in 
some firms, data programed for repetitive replacement de-
3 Vernon L. Smith, "Economic Equipment Policies: An Evalua· 
tion," Management Science, IV (Oct., 1957), 20-37. Reprinted in 
Edward H. Bowman and Robert B. Fetter, Analyses of Industrial 
Operations (Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1959), pp. 
444-62. 
4 Bowman and Fetter, 460. 
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cisions may be useful for management control but are un-
important in the actual decision to replace a specific asset, 
but ( 2) in other firms, financial accounting statements pro-
vide a source of data which, when used correctly, are helpful 
for the analysis of replacement decisions. 
There is little difference between the problem of choos-
ing among a number of new assets and that of replacing old 
assets: comparative data are required for both kinds of 
analysis. However, a firm can rarely anticipate investment 
decisions such as expansion, renovation, and innovation. 
Accounting data are of little help in such decisions. 
Original thinking and new sources of data must aid the 
appraisal of a course of action not previously taken by the 
firm. But the next case illustrates how accounting can per-
form a function in decision making in general, even when 
it has little direct effect on any single decision. 
Lake Concrete Products installed a new product line requiring 
a sizable initial investment. Subsequently, Mr. Lake maintains 
records of sales and costs of the new product. The intent of 
this practice is to check the accuracy of estimates and to learn 
from mistakes. 
Although Mr. Lake may never again make a product-line 
decision of this sort, he recognizes that his predictive ability 
is important for successful operation. Accounting provides 
means by which learning from experience can be made a 
part of the firm's routine. 
PRICING DECISIONS OF FOUR FIRMS 
The small firms included in this study differ in the extent 
to which they adhere to a full-cost plus a markup basis in 
pricing. Some firms adhere rigidly to the full-cost basis; 
others emphasize demand and market conditions in pricing 
decisions. In this section, we examine these various patterns 
of behavior, using cases as illustrations. 
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Full costs rigidly used 
A concrete product manufacturer has a local monopoly 
on some products, but the manager prices all products on 
the basis of full cost plus 100 percent. The owner maintains 
a card file in which he records the full cost of each product; 
when the firm's costs increase, the owner spreads the increase 
over all products and announces a new price schedule. 
When asked why he bases prices solely on cost without 
consideration of demand, the owner replied that he requires 
every product to "carry its fair share of overhead." He 
evaluates the profitability of each product on the basis of 
its return in excess of direct costs plus allocated overhead. 
Underlying this policy is, perhaps, an unsophisticated recog-
nition of opportunity costs; if each product is recovering its 
share of overhead, then the fixed facilities are being optimally 
allocated among the various products. 
A second reason for not differentiating prices on the 
basis of demand is the owner's concern for his reputation as 
a "fair" businessman. Over the years the owner has presented 
a consistent and stable basis for prices to the public; he 
fears that any other method of pricing would destroy the 
customer relations that he enjoys. He recognizes that an 
inelastic demand exists for many of his products, but raising 
prices to take advantage of the situation would be incon-
sistent with his basic policy of "fairness." 
Full costs used with some flexibility 
A building materials (precast stone) manufacturer pre-
pares estimates of full costs for bidding purposes. The 
estimates invariably include nonincremental overhead cost 
allocations in addition to labor and materials. However, the 
markup varies according to each job and, in many instances, 
the price is below full costs. The firm is trying to build up 
a market, and the management believes that it must evaluate 
each prospective contract on an individual basis. 
The full-cost estimates serve only as a starting point in 
pricing; the firm would willingly take a contract at less than 
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full costs if the customer offered possibilities for future sales. 
If there is little information available on potential future 
sales, or if it is a competitively bid contract, the firm will 
insist that the price be at least full cost. This case study is 
consistent with Bartschi's findings of widespread use of 
full-cost estimates in the precast stone industry.5 But the 
case suggests that full-cost estimates are only a first step in 
pricing decisions. 
Full costs with complete adjustment to competition 
A ready-mixed concrete producer prepared an ad hoc 
study of product costs for use in a decision to lower the 
price schedule. A new firm had recently entered the market 
with a price somewhat less than the stabilized market price. 
The firm examined the income statements and made special 
studies of truck operating costs to determine the full cost of 
delivered concrete. When the study of costs was completed, 
the firm published a new schedule in which the unit prices 
were greater than both full-cost and the new entrant's prices. 
The firm found that it still could not compete with the 
new one; others in the market were lowering their prices, 
putting added pressure on the management. The firm 
lowered its prices; the re-revised price schedule was, with 
few exceptions, identical to that of the new entrant's and 
below full costs. In this case, the pricing decision started 
with an estimate of full costs, but demand and competitor's 
actions were the principal determinants of the final outcome. 
Full costs not used 
A concrete block manufacturer mentioned earlier pre-
pared an estimate of incremental costs when deciding upon 
the price of a new product. The owner searched for infor-
mation on prospective demand and competitors' reactions. 
The final price resulted only after the owner considered both 
incremental costs and demand. 
5 Donald P. Bartschi, "Costing Pre-Cast Stone for Estimating and 
Control," N.A.C.A. Bulletin, XXXVII (Jan., 1956), 644-7. 
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The owner does not know the full cost of the firm's 
major products-concrete and cinder blocks. The market 
for building blocks during the construction season is very 
competitive and prices fluctuate as the several firms in the 
market attempt to maintain volume. The owner does know 
the approximate incremental cost of building blocks, since 
it consists only of materials; labor costs are fixed for the 
entire year. The owner takes contracts that he thinks yield 
only a few cents per block in excess of incremental costs. 
In this highly competitive market, full cost means nothing 
to the firm's owner; his principal concerns in pricing de-
cisions are incremental cost, demand, and competitive prices. 
Evaluation of the pricing practices 
The case studies indicate a variety of practices in using 
cost data for pricing decisions. Full-cost estimates may be 
the sole determinant of price, or they may serve only as a 
starting point. But the question remains: why do firms 
calculate full costs? The weaknesses and limitations of cost 
data requiring arbitrary allocations of overhead are well 
recognized in the literature: "it is necessary to recognize the 
fact that cost allocation at the best is loaded with assumption 
and that in many cases highly arbitrary methods of appor-
tionment are employed in practice. Certainly it is wise not 
to take the results of the usual process of internal cost 
imputation seriously."6 In spite of such pronouncements, 
firms continue to make full-cost estimates. 
P. J. D. Wiles indicates that there are several explana-
tions for the practice of full-cost pricing: 7 ( 1 ) firms are 
ignorant of demand elasticities and in this ignorance they 
will stick to any price that proves to be profitable; ( 2) the 
outcome of price experiments are uncertain and this un-
6 William A. Paton and A. C. Littleton, An Introduction to Cor-
porate Accounting Standards (New York: American Accounting As-
sociation, 1940), p. 120. 
7 Price, Cost and Output (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1961), pp. 
47-8. 
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certainty alone is sufficient to keep the firm's "playing safe"; 
( 3) frequent changes in volume (resulting from price 
changes) are impracticable for production planning; ( 4) fre-
quent price changes can result in loss of customer goodwill; 
and ( 5) a period of constant prices is necessary to estimate 
demand; firms prefer to hold an established price for a 
season and, if sales are low, they lower the price the following 
season. All these explanations are, in some way, applicable 
to the firms in this study which rigidly apply full cost plus 
a predetermined markup. 
Wiles ignores the explanation that by charging each 
product with a share of the fixed facility cost, the firm is 
attempting to determine the opportunity cost. This ex-
planation is borne out by the desire of the firm that every 
product should carry its share of the overhead. Carl T. 
Devine denies that firms are able to measure opportunity 
costs by allocating overhead, since the true measure of a 
product's profitability is its contribution to fixed costs.8 
There is no reason that an overhead allocation will give the 
correct measurement of opportunity cost when excess ca-
pacity exists; at the other extreme, such allocations do not 
measure the opportunity costs in the case of great pressure 
of many alternatives on limited capacity. Thus overhead 
allocations almost inevitably overstate or understate the 
true opportunity costs. 
From a practical standpoint, the building up of prices 
from full-cost data sidesteps some of the uncertainties of 
demand and market reactions. However, a rigid application 
of full costs in a market which does not allow such a naive 
approach could be disastrous. The cases indicate that small 
firms do adjust to demand and competition. 
To summarize, the presence of full-cost estimates does 
not mean that the pricing decisions rest solely on costs. The 
firm can and does make adjustments to demand conditions; 
but if the firm can ignore demand in pricing, full costs plus 
8 "Cost Accounting and Pricing Policies," Accounting Review, 
XXV (Oct., 1950), 384-9. Reprinted in Thomas, pp. 333-41. 
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a markup provide a stable, consistent basis for prices in the 
face of uncertainty. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE 
The discussion of the role of accounting in product-line, in-
vestment, and pricing decisions leads to the following sug-
gestions. 
1. Small manufacturing firms can use periodic studies 
of product costs more practicably than integrated cost sys-
tems in decision making.9 The cost of full-fledged cost ac-
counting systems is prohibitive. Management can make 
ad hoc cost studies quickly and easily; an added advantage of 
special studies is that management will not be tempted to 
use cost data that are readily available but that are incorrect 
for the particular problem being considered. 
2. Small manufacturing firms could use marginal in-
come analysis in preparing periodic cost studies. The infor-
mation would be helpful in firms operating in highly competi-
tive markets, since it would indicate the floor for prices. 
Firms operating in less competitive markets and presently 
pricing on the basis of full-cost estimates would find marginal 
income information extremely valuable in product-line ad-
justment and evaluation decisions. A decision to drop a line, 
for example, must include estimates of escapable costs and 
revenues; this kind of information is available if marginal 
income analysis is used. Otherwise, if the firm employs 
full-cost data, the management must separate the incremental 
cost from the sunk cost.1o 
3. Small manufacturing firms should maintain selected 
accounting data, especially the kinds of information that 
9 This suggestion is supported by Edward S. Thompson, "A Pro-
gram for Profitable Use of Costs in a Small Factory," N.A.A. Bulletin, 
XL (Jan., 1959), 53. 
to Thompson, ibid., p. 55, and John W. Christie, "A Concrete 
Products Company Uses Direct Costing with Standard Costs," 
N.A.C.A. Bulletin, XXXVIII (Jan., 1957), 690 prescribe marginal in-
come analysis for small firms. 
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would enable management to follow up the results of de-
cisions. Investment decisions involve projections of future 
revenues and costs; firms could check the accuracy of their 
estimates by accumulating the data and comparing the re-
sults with the forecasts. If the decision is reversible, manage-
ment has solid information on which to base its subsequent 
action; if the decision is irreversible, management can note 
its errors and improve future decision making. 
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5 
PRINTING FIRMS 
[JN THE CONTEXT of printing, we take up an issue 
which has broad implications for industries in general: under 
what circumstances is it advantageous to program accounting 
data for one kind of decision? The discussion of this issue 
is based on an analysis of three topics: ( l) the implications 
of accounting methods which develop cost data for pricing 
decisions; ( 2) case studies of pricing decisions of actual 
printing firms, with emphasis on the role of accounting; and 
( 3) the use of ad hoc economic analysis for other types of 
decisions. 
SOME GENERALIZATIONS 
We start with some generalizations based both upon the 
literature on printing industry accounting and upon the case 
studies. 
I. There is a movement in the industry, led by trade 
associations and large printing firms, which encourages 
printers to determine accurately the "cost of doing business."1 
The full cost of individual jobs is considered by proponents 
of the movement to be the important consideration in 
pricing decisions. Accounting systems are designed to pro-
duce full-cost data. 
2. Printers are incapable of recovering the full cost of 
every job. Competitive pressures prevent strict adherence to 
"full cost plus profit" bases in pricing decisions. The ac-
counting determination of full costs serves little purpose in 
some decisions except to establish a floor (albeit flexible) 
below which prices should not fall. 
3. In large firms, accounting is an important tool for 
cost control. This function of accounting is closely related 
to the size of the firm. Smaller firms of three to six employees 
rely on management supervision for cost control. 
4. The homeostatic function of accounting is evident 
in several case studies. The practice of revising hourly cost 
rates on the basis of reported net income illustrates this 
function of accounting. Control systems in some printing 
firms develop measures which play a part in the homeostatic 
process. Some firms experiment with standard cost systems; 
others use less refined control methods. 
5. Accounting data are not used in equipment replace-
1 In a series of articles appearing in an industry newsletter, Print· 
ing Impressions (March-July, 1960), Theodore P. Von Bosse reports 
that prices on a hypothetical job on which printers were asked to bid 
covered a wide range. This variation, the author states, is an indication 
that printers do not "know their costs." Von Bosse ignores demand 
as an important price determinant, especially the fact that demand 
elasticities differ in the various markets in which the respondents 
operate. 
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ment decisions. In fact, little quantitative analysis is used 
in decisions of this type. Accounting cost systems may in-
fluence the decisions by indicating the inefficiencies of con-
tinued operation of the equipment. 
PRINTING INDUSTRY 
ACCOUNTING METHODS 
One purpose of cost accounting methods in the printing 
industry is to develop information for use in the pricing 
decision.2 Current literature maintains that "job cost plus 
profit equals selling price."3 This literature expounds on the 
proposition that "full cost" is the relevant concept of cost to 
use in pricing decisions. Accounting methods are designed 
to develop the full cost of every order going through a job 
print shop. In order to understand the accounting tech-
niques used in printing, it is necessary to outline the proc-
esses required to produce printed matter. 
The production flow 
Figure 3 is a simplified representation of the work per-
formed by most printers.4 Every job must go through some 
or all of these processes. ( 1) An order is received by a printer. 
The customer specifies what is to be printed, how it is to be 
printed, and how much is to be printed. (2) Materials are 
requisitioned from the stockroom and specifications are sent 
to the composing room. ( 3) In the composing room, the 
printed material is reproduced in a form required by the 
particular press on which the work is to be done.5 ( 4) A 
2 Although accounting methods in printing firms serve other pur-
poses, the literature and interviewees stress the importance of this 
purpose. 
3 Peter Becker, Jr., Managing Your Business (Washington, D. C.: 
Printing Industry of America, 19 59), p. 14. 
4 This diagram is based partly on a figure in William Green, 
"Wellesley Press, Inc.," a Harvard Business School Case (Inter-
collegiate Case Clearing House Index No. 3C9, 1958). 
5 The flow diagram assumes a letterpress operation. To convert 
the diagram to one applying to an offset press, substitute "offset plates" 
for "galley." 
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Figure 3. Production flow diagram for a small printshop 
CUSTOMER 
(Bill) (Order) 
OFFICE 1-- STOCKROOM 
(Specifications} 
BINDING COMPOSITION (Material) 
(Galley) 
LOCKUP - PRESS 
(Locked Galley) 
CUTTING 8 t---- COLLATING 
TRIMMING 
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"galley proof" is made up in the composing room and sent 
to the customer for approval. ( 5) If the customer approves, 
the type is "locked up," i.e., various operations are performed 
to ready the galley for use in the press. ( 6) The locked 
galley is taken to the press, which produces the order in the 
desired quantities. (7) The job leaves the pressroom and re-
ceives whatever additional work is necessary. Cutting and 
trimming are necessary on most jobs, but collating and bind-
ing are required only for part of the jobs. 
To estimate the cost of a particular job, the printer de-
termines the extent to which the costs of each production 
process (materials, composing, presswork, cutting, collating, 
etc.) adhere to the job as it passes through the plant. A job 
is casted on the basis of the time taken to go through each 
of the processes (hereafter called "cost centers") .6 There 
are two principal accounting methods by which cost data 
are obtained: the all-inclusive hour cost method and the 
factory-hour cost method.7 
All-inclusive hour cost method 
This method of costing printed matter is receiving the 
most attention in current literature and in actual practice. 
Its present status is largely due to the efforts of the Printing 
Industry of America (a trade association) and other spokes-
men. The method is simple and requires only a minimum 
of computational effort. 
The first step in developing all-inclusive hour costs is to 
forecast the costs for a future time period8-usually a year, 
but the period may vary. The printer allocates all factory 
(or production) costs to each of the cost centers. For ex-
6 Cost of materials is based on quantity required by the job and 
is not a "cost center" as we use the term here. 
7 In this discussion, we emphasize the use of predetermined hourly 
costs as the method for obtaining job costs. It is conceivable that 
printers can and do use a simple job order cost method, but from our 
experience, the method is not widely used. 
8 One system (popularly known as the "MYB" system) refers to 
such costs as "budgeted costs" and the subsequently developed hourly 
costs are termed "budgeted hourly rates." See Becker. 
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ample, a particular press is charged with the depreciation of 
the press and a portion of plant depreciation (based on floor 
space), the wages of the pressmen, and other factory over-
head items on some "reasonable" basis. Total factory costs 
for the ensuing period are thus determined for each cost 
center. Selling and administrative expenses are allocated to 
each cost center based on the relationship of total selling and 
administrative expense to factory expense. For example, if 
total expected factory costs are $10,000 and total expected 
selling and administrative costs are $3,000, an additional 30 
cents is allocated to the cost center for every $1.00 factory 
cost. The result is total cost for each cost center for the 
coming period. 
It is now necessary to determine the hour costs. To do 
this, the printer estimates the number of hours that each cost 
center is to be in operation and how much of this time is 
"chargeable" to the customer.9 Estimated chargeable hours 
for each cost center are divided into total cost of that cost 
center, resulting in "all-inclusive hour cost." 
To price a job, the time spent in each productive process 
is multiplied by the hourly cost of the process and the result 
is added to the cost of materials; a profit margin is added to 
this total. 
Factory-hour cost method 
Factory-hour cost determination requires the same gen-
eral calculations as all-inclusive hour costs. However, the 
resultant hourly costs include only the direct factory costs-
no attempt is made to allocate selling and administrative 
costs to cost centers. Using this method, a printing job is 
priced as follows: ( l) time spent in each cost center is 
multiplied by the factory-hour rate; ( 2) to this figure is 
added the cost of materials; ( 3) to this total is added an 
9 Subtracting nonchargeable hours (the total of time spent on 
activities for which a customer cannot be billed) from the total hours 
that a cost center is to be in operation results in an estimate of charge-
able hours (time spent on activities for which a customer can be 
billed). 
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amount (percentage markup on cost) to "cover selling, ad-
ministrative expenses, and profit." 
A legitimate question that can be asked at this point is 
why we find these two methods in use. A recent article in a 
trade journal contrasts these two methods in terms of ad-
vantages and disadvantages.10 The author, E. T. Leverenz, 
lists these advantages of the all-inclusive cost method: it is 
a tried method familiar to all printers; and it requires less 
detail, since it is not necessary to use additional percentages 
to absorb selling and administrative costs (when pricing 
the job). The disadvantages of the system are: (1) the cost 
of handling materials (a factory overhead account) is spread 
over all cost centers and charged to each job. When the 
customer furnishes certain materials, he is charged handling 
cost even though no such cost is incurred.11 ( 2) There is no 
opportunity for standardization or comparison of costs within 
the industry. Selling and administrative costs vary so that 
hour costs are different from plant to plant. ( 3) There is 
no provision for ascertaining the costs of outside purchases. 
(On some jobs, printers must "farm out" some of the work 
and the anticipated costs of handling and financing these 
purchases are spread over all cost centers.) 
Leverenz prefers factory-hour costs. He argues that 
selling and administrative functions are separate cost centers 
and that all segments of the business should "stand on their 
own feet." Some jobs require more selling and administrative 
effort than others; the factory-hour method permits dif-
ferentiation of overhead cost allocations. 
Hour costs and decision making 
The data produced by the all-inclusive hour cost method 
are estimates of full cost-of the average total cost for each 
chargeable hour. Marginal economic analysis suggests that 
10 E. T. Leverenz, "Pricing Policy," Graphic Arts Monthly, XXXI 
(Sept., 1959), 8-12. 
11 The author suggests that "handling costs" be set up as a sep-
arate cost center and not treated as overhead. 
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such data are inappropriate for pricing decisions, for they 
stress full costs rather than incremental costs. 
Once a printing firm is committed to a rate of output, 
the cost function is insensitive to small changes in output. 
The sensitivity to upward changes depends a great deal on 
how close the printer is to capacity, but unless there is a 
dramatic change in output, costs are relatively fixed. The 
only variable elements of a printing job are materials and 
some factory costs (and selling costs if salesmen are on a 
commission basis). In fact, case studies suggest that variable 
costs are between 30 percent and 50 percent of total costs 
for shortrun changes in output. This indicates that all-
inclusive hour costs are far removed from the incremental 
cost of a particular job; factory-hour costs more nearly ap-
proximate incremental cost. But neither method develops 
incremental data. Why then are such data used in pricing? 
This question can be evaluated after we examine case 
materials. 
CASE STUDIES OF THE ROLE OF 
ACCOUNTING IN DECISION MAKING 
The seven firms fall into three categories based on organiza-
tional considerations. At one extreme, decisions result from 
the interaction of several persons within the organization; 
that is, specialization is evident in varying degrees. At the 
other extreme, decisions emanate from one source, that is, 
there is only one "decider." Between these two extremes, 
there are firms which employ some specialization in the 
decision-making process. 
A firm with specialized decision-making processes 
We start with the largest printing firm-one with con-
siderable specialization in management. 
Phillips Printing Firm is located in a large midwestern city 
and employs approximately 200 persons. Although the firm 
is in keen competition with some 75 printers of various sizes, 
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there is some differentiation of product based on quality, service, 
and location. 
The company considers the full cost (as determined by 
all-inclusive hour costs) of each job to be the floor on pricing. 
This floor is determined by estimators, who anticipate the time 
to be consumed in each cost center. As the job is scheduled 
through the plant, it is accompanied by a "tracer" which records 
the actual costs. Upon completion of jobs, actual and esti-
mated costs are compared. If a job is subject to a firm bid, 
the comparison of actual costs with estimated costs serves only 
as a control device (both production efficiency and the ac-
curacy of estimators are checked). If a job is non bid (i.e., priced 
when finished), the tracer provides information for pricing. 
A markup schedule categorizes jobs into five types. This schedule 
reflects demand and competition. Higher markups are applied 
to jobs which are "first runs" or which involve a great deal of 
"crea ti vi ty." 
Accounting data are not used in other major decisions 
(equipment replacement, product-line decisions, etc.) except 
as control data which call attention to inefficient operations. 
Equipment replacement decisions are highly subjective, often 
governed by the criterion of postponability. 
There are three important control reports for each cost 
center; these reports are designed to show the following re-
lationships: ( l) actual hour costs and predetermined hour 
costs-the hour costs may be revised if predetermined costs 
are out of line with actual costs; ( 2) chargeable hours and 
nonchargeable hours-this report enables the firm to set effi-
ciency standards for each center; ( 3) standard time reports-
the firm is in the process of establishing standard times, aimed 
toward establishing a standard cost system and routine cost 
estimating. 
This firm prices on the basis of full cost for various reasons: 
( l) management considers it unethical to price at less; ( 2) price 
shading for some orders could destroy the goodwill that this 
firm has established; ( 3) low profit jobs may interfere with 
scheduling high profit orders. Management recognizes that the 
incremental costs of a job are low in printing and that this is a 
reason for keen price competition, yet rejects flexible pricing 
as basically unsound. 
Two firms with less specialized decision-making processes 
The two cases cited in this section are comparable in 
size and in pricing policies. They are in competition with 
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approximately twenty other small job printers. Their prac-
tices and policies concerning accounting and pricing de-
cisions are similar and can be discussed concurrently. 
Tracy Printing Company and Hunt Lithographers specialize in 
small job order printing; they do not undertake exceptionally 
long run jobs. The managements of both firms indicate that 
the majority of their business is on a nonbid basis, i.e., prices 
are determined only after jobs are completed. On bid contracts 
of significant size, the quoted price often results from confer-
ences between salesmen and management. 
Both firms invariably use "all-inclusive hour costs" as a 
base for prices. Neither firm has established a schedule of mark-
ups; rather, the markup varies according to management's idea 
about competitive conditions. 
Both firms are active promoters of common accounting 
systems for all small printers. The managements of both firms 
express the philosophy that each job must cover full costs. 
Control techniques are not used extensively. The account-
ing systems have not been developed to the extent that cost 
control data flow routinely to management; cost control de-
pends upon supervision rather than reports. The efficiency 
of individual cost centers is gauged by the ability of the centers 
to cover their full costs. The focus of attention on allocated 
costs is consistent with the full-cost philosophy. 
As in the Phillips Printing case, accounting data are used in 
pricing decisions. Accounting determination of full costs 
establishes the lower limit on price; demand considerations 
are reflected in the profit markup. Tracers accompany each 
job (as in Phillips), making possible a comparison of esti-
mated costs and actual costs for control. Hourly costs are 
reviewed and revised once a year when annual financial state-
ments are available. 
Nonprice decisions are based primarily on data other 
than those developed by the accounting systems. Equipment 
replacement decisions, for example, result from subjective 
analysis. They require estimates of future technological 
change which are difficult to quantify because of great un-
certainty. Similarly, some make or buy decisions rest pri-
marily on nonquantitative analyses. For example, Tracy 
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Printing decided to "farm out" binding to a distant firm, 
based on an estimate of opportunity costs. Management 
"felt" that the space occupied by the binding department 
could be used more profitably in other operations. No at-
tempt was made to quantify the opportunity cost. 
Three firms with one-man decision makers 
In this section, we discuss three firms, one of which 
competes in the same market as Phillips Printing, one com-
petes actively with Tracy and Hunt, and the third operates 
in a small-town duopoly situation. 
Wall's Printing Firm specializes in small jobs which are of 
the type usually ignored by Phillips Printing. The owner's phi-
losophy of pricing is strongly inclined toward full cost. All-
inclusive cost rates are used by the owner to arrive at price. 
The hourly costs determined by the accounting system are com-
pared with published regional rates; if the firm's cost rates are 
too high or too low as compared with the published rates, the 
latter may be used in pricing. The owner resists reductions of 
price below levels indicated by full costs, but makes rare 
exceptions. Accounting data provide some means of validating 
cost estimates of individual jobs-although comparison of actual 
costs with estimated costs is not done systematically. 
Kitty-Hawk Printing adopted the all-inclusive cost method only 
six months prior to the case interview. Before adoption, the 
owner relied heavily on a regional selling rates manual and 
subjective judgment. Adoption of the method resulted in an 
increase in the overall price structure with little loss of regular 
customers and increased income for the six months. However, 
strict application of data secured from accounting is impossible. 
For example, one cost center has, by accounting determination, 
a cost rate twice that of other firms in the market. Rather than 
risk pricing on this basis, the rate was lowered in line with com-
petition. This firm has not adopted all the refinements of the 
system; cost control is not yet afforded by the system. 
Independent Lithographer is located in a small town and com-
petes with one other firm. Although Independent Lithographer 
and the other firm have tacitly agreed to segregate the market 
into two parts, each firm must still anticipate the reaction of 
the other to individual pricing decisions. The owner of Inde-
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pendent recognizes this interdependence and estimates carefully 
the cost and demand characteristics of each job. As the owner 
stated, hourly costs would be useless unless they were similarly 
estimated in both firms. 
Evaluation of the pricing practices in the cases 
The case studies suggest that there are good reasons for 
the policy of full costs in the printing industry. 
l. Printing firms make large numbers of pricing de-
cisions on orders that are highly diverse. The demand con-
ditions vary greatly from one order to another; in addition, 
there is great uncertainty about demand itself. An individual 
analysis of incremental revenue and cost on each order is 
expensive and of doubtful use. The way in which printing 
firms simplify pricing decisions is to use mechanical ac-
counting techniques for determining full costs and to add 
markups to those costs. In this way they circumvent much of 
the problem of uncertainty and the difficulties of measure-
ment. 
2. Most firms in the market recognize that the demand 
for printed matter is relatively inelastic. High prices through-
out the industry could result in more profit for the indi-
vidual firm. Printing firms hope that the widespread use of 
full costs will limit price competition and permit higher 
profits for the whole industry. There are firms which do not 
think in such industrywide terms; these firms perceive im-
mediate profit opportunities to be gained from pricing in-
crementally, recognizing that out-of-pocket costs of a single 
job are very low. The supporters of full-cost pricing are 
trying to bring these "price cutters" into line by encouraging 
the use of common accounting methods. 
3. The awareness that price competition is "not so 
good" for the individual firm is expressed in ethical ob-
jections to price shading (and to price gouging) . Full costs 
provide a standard against which the price behavior of firms 
can be evaluated; no doubt many printers avoid prices that 
violate that standard. 
4. Many printers believe that consistent references to 
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full costs in pncmg contribute to customer goodwill and 
thus to volume and profits. Greater flexibility might lead 
to customer objections to "unfair" discrimination. 
There are, however, arguments against too much stress 
on full costs. A completely mechanical application of pre-
determined markups on full costs would preclude any ad-
justment to market forces; most printers vary their markups 
from one category of business to another and from job to 
job. In other words they do not push full-cost reasoning to 
the extreme. There must also be doubt that attempts to 
limit competition through full-cost formulas can work. Such 
formulas do not prevent the entry of new firms; they do not 
keep existing firms with excess capacity from shading prices 
to get business that contributes to overhead. 
In other words, full-cost formulas provide only a partial 
solution to the problem of pricing in printing. It is easy to 
understand the stress on full costs in the industry; it is also 
understandable that there is not complete adherence to 
those costs. 
ROUTINIZED DECISION MAKING 
VERSUS AD HOC ANALYSIS 
Printers use two approaches to decision making. One is to 
rely heavily on programed data; the discussion so far has 
stressed programed full costs for pricing. The alternative is 
to rely on nonprogramed analyses. The use of such ad hoc 
analysis is illustrated in two decisions in a printing firm that 
was closely observed over a period of years by one of the 
interviewers. 
The Forkland Printing Company is now nonexistent, but at the 
time these decisions were made, it was an active firm in a large 
competitive market. The accounting system was maintained 
primarily for financial reports, which indicated that the com-
pany was barely breaking even. Pricing decisions were based 
primarily on a manual of regional hour rates. The pricing policy 
was full cost plus a fixed markup, but hour cost data were not 
produced by the accounting system. 
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Decisions on the size of the sales force. The company's 
sales force consisted of the full-time efforts of a sales manager 
and the part-time efforts of the president and vice president. 
At one time a salesman was hired, but he subsequently was the 
subject of a problem debated by the board of directors. There 
was a group of directors which felt that this salesman was 
uneconomical. These directors pointed out that the salesman's 
commission was considerably below his guarantee and that this 
situation was surely unprofitable. 
Economic analysis suggests that more serious thought to 
the size of the force would have been justified and that the 
issue should have been expansion rather than contraction of the 
sales force. One board member made an ad hoc analysis of the 
financial statements which included an estimate that variable 
costs were roughly 50 percent of the total cost and of revenue. 
He also pointed out that the company had idle capacity. 
His analysis, shown below, suggests that a low volume of added 
sales would have justified the employment of an additional 
salesman. 
Estimated incremental revenue 
Incremental cost of printing $10,000 
Incremental salesman's guarantee 
and travel expense 5,000 
Incremental Cost 
Net Incremental Revenue 
$20,000 
15,000 
$5,000 
This estimate indicates that an added salesman would have 
contributed $5,000 to fixed cost and profits of this company. 
Even with sales as low as $10,000 per year, the company 
would break even. 
It was a mistake for the company to ignore the possibility of 
additional salesmen, assuming that the "tailor-made" cost 
and revenue analysis was valid. True enough, the cost data 
were taken from financial accounting statements-statements 
which were not designed to provide such data. Even if the 
income statement had been arranged to show variable and 
fixed elements of cost, additional analysis would have been 
required. The salesman's guarantee would have been an 
incremental cost, but an income statement would have 
classified it as fixed. 
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Decisions on the sale or liquidation of the company. Since the 
company was not particularly profitable, it occurred to one 
director that liquidation or sale might be desirable. He pointed 
out that the expenses of the company were understated from 
the opportunity cost point of view. The most important ex-
ample was depreciation on the building, which was recorded 
in the accounts at almost nothing. The building was fifty years 
old and only certain improvements were being depreciated. 
The rental value of the building was at least $500 per month. 
The company was sacrificing the opportunity to earn this rental 
by remaining in printing. Similarly, the depreciation on the 
equipment reflected original costs, neglecting the higher replace-
ment costs that would be necessary if the firm were to stay 
in business. In short, the accounting statements were grossly 
misleading. They led to a false sense of complacency by con-
cealing the fact that the company was losing money from an 
economic point of view. 
Opportunity cost reasoning led to the sale of the company, 
a decision that was certainly sound. The only alternative would 
have been a sharp change in the technology or management, 
neither of which seemed likely in view of the financial stress. 
The accounts appear to have been of little help in this 
decision, aside from listing the assets and the expense cate-
gories. It is of interest, however, that the sale price was at 
book value. All parties to the sale recognized that the book 
value was out of touch with current realities, but the ac-
counting figure offered a reference point for a compromise. 
Thus accounts may serve an important function by providing 
something definite to which decisions can be referred. When 
decision makers are confused by a multitude of variables 
involving much uncertainty, it is understandable that they 
may turn to something that appears to be "definite," even 
though in theory it may be quite irrelevant. 
INDUSTRY COMPARISONS 
It is unnecessary to construct a prescriptive model for print-
ing, but an indication of the ways in which the environment 
conditioning decision making in printing is similar to or 
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different from that in nurseries and retailing may explain the 
diversity in decision processes from industry to industry. 
Production characteristics 
The production characteristics in printing differ from 
those in nurseries and retail establishments. As compared 
with the nurseries, printing involves shortrun rather than 
longrun flexibility in production; the equipment and plant 
layout permit a rapid shift from one kind of production to 
another. In printing, decisions on product mix are not so 
much concerned with conjectural estimates of long-distant 
future events. Most printing costs, such as material and 
labor costs, can be estimated with some accuracy prior to 
actual production. It is possible to develop definite pro-
cedures by which "costs" can be estimated, as is shown in 
the case studies. The existence of cost estimates that appear 
to have some substance influences management to give them 
more attention. 
When it comes to longrun decisions, such as the pur-
chase of new equipment, the uncertainty is equally great in 
both printing firms and nurseries; it is not surprising that 
managers in both industries make use of subjective estimates 
and rules of thumb on such decisions. 
The production characteristics of printing are more like 
those in retailing, in which there is also a great deal of 
flexibility in product mix. Retailers, like printers, can shift 
rapidly from one product variation to another. In both 
industries, flexibility is limited by the layout and by the 
company's reputation for special products. The flexibility 
arises in different ways, however; in printing it involves a 
change in the mix of work flowing through the plant; in 
retailing it involves a change in the items displayed on the 
shelves in a single location. 
Variable costs are a smaller proportion of total costs in 
printing than in retailing; labor costs are relatively fixed for 
shortrun changes in volume. In retailing, variable costs in-
clude wholesale costs which are from half to two-thirds of 
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the total. One might expect that prices would be more 
flexible in printing, because of the greater proportional dif-
ference between price and incremental cost. There are 
several reasons why this is not the case. 
I. The inventory situation is different in the two in-
dustries. Retailers invest a large proportion of their capital 
in inventory and are therefore under pressure to sell. To do 
so, they frequently resort to markdowns-a kind of price 
flexibility. 
Printers, on the other hand, have no comparable invest-
ment in inventory (mainly paper); furthermore, the paper 
can be used for a variety of jobs and often can be ordered 
after a job has been sold. Hence, in printing the pressure of 
inventory does not encourage flexible prices. 
2. Retailers recognize that some goods tie up floor 
space and sales personnel longer than others. While they 
do not measure the relevant opportunity costs, they set 
variable markups on wholesale costs that reflect roughly the 
differences in opportunity costs. 
Printing managers face the problem of estimating op-
portunity costs. But there is no wholesale cost that could 
supply a reasonable base for markups; material costs would 
certainly not provide such a base, since they vary erratically 
from one job to another. Printers must establish a different 
base; usually they adopt some measure of chargeable hours 
on the presses or other processes to which they allocate 
overhead. In other words, overhead allocation takes the 
place of a variable markup as an indicator of opportunity 
costs. 
Printers have "an inventory of time," and their ac-
counting methods are designed to provide a rough allocation 
of the opportunity costs of that time, just as retail markups 
provide a rough estimate of the opportunity costs of store 
space. Printing overhead allocations provide a means of 
rationing time; they help insure that a firm will not schedule 
orders that interfere with more profitable orders. Retail 
markups are reversible; if merchandise does not sell, it can 
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be cleared out of the way by price reductions. But printing 
prices for individual orders are set once and for all, and no 
price reduction would clear space for other business. 
Why, then, are printers more inflexible in insisting on 
the recovery of the full cost of each job? We have suggested 
several reasons. They are concerned with allocation of future 
space rather than the sale of present inventories. Further-
more, they are probably influenced by the "mythology of 
costs." Full costs appear to be something solid and sub-
stantial that should not be compromised; a markup, on the 
other hand, is something projected out "into the air" that 
can easily be adapted to circumstances. 
Market characteristics 
It might also be possible to explain the differences in 
decision-making procedures from industry to industry in 
terms of market characteristics. If, for example, oligopoly 
were more characteristic of printing than of nurseries or re-
tailing, this might help explain the attention to full costs. 
But such is not the case. In all three industries there is a 
mixture of market characteristics. Some of the printers 
operate in large cities and compete in a national market on 
part of their business; the wholesale nurseries also operate in 
a national market, while some of the retailers face competi-
tion from a fairly large number of firms. At the other ex-
treme, one of the printers in this study faces only one 
competitor in a small town; there are also cases of both 
nurseries and retailers facing limited numbers of competitors. 
Similarly, there is the same problem of complementarity 
of demand in each of the three industries. The sales of one 
product influence the sales of others; present products and 
prices affect the company "image" and customer goodwill. 
Printers differ in one respect in dealing with the market; 
they send salesmen into the market instead of waiting for 
customers to arrive; these salesmen must be provided with 
standards for pricing, giving another reason for the emphasis 
on full costs. 
87 
In short, the different status of accounting in decision 
making in the three industries appears to be based more on 
production characteristics and on the conventions of man-
agement than on market conditions. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE 
In general, printers use programed accounting methods for 
pricing and ad hoc analyses for other decisions. Is there any 
reason for them to change this pattern? 
I. Full costs provide a convenient starting point in 
pricing; we have presented several arguments favoring the 
routinization of cost estimates for pricing in printing. But 
printers may rely too heavily on full costs, applying them in 
market situations where greater flexibility is warranted. In 
any case, printers should not expect too much success from 
their efforts to stabilize industrywide prices through adoption 
of common accounting procedures; the industry is too com-
petitive, except in some specialized local markets, to permit 
this type of price control to work. 
2. Small printers have much to gain from a fuller de-
velopment of cost control systems that provide signals indi-
cating costs that are out of line. Such controls would help 
indicate areas in which there is a need for decision making. 
3. Printers must continue to rely heavily on ad hoc 
analyses, both for pricing situations in which full-cost esti-
mates are not appropriate and for investment, make or buy, 
and other types of decisions. Perhaps they should give some 
attention to new quantitative methods of organizing infor-
mation for decisions, but they must continue to use con-
siderable subjective judgment. 
4. Many printers could profit from greater attention 
to the incremental, discounting, and opportunity cost princi-
ples in their ad hoc analyses, making certain that they adapt 
the concepts and measurements to the problems at hand. 
In conclusion, there is much to be said for the routinized 
accounting methods that are being developed in the print-
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ing industry, especially for control and pricing. There is, 
however, a danger that management may be unduly in-
fluenced by the full-cost data supplied by such methods, 
failing to approach special decision-making problems with 
the full flexibility of analysis required. 
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6 
CASE STUDIES OF 
INCREMENTAL ANALYSIS 
[JN THIS chapter we undertake a more direct discussion 
of incremental analysis, covering cases not included in pre-
vious chapters. Incremental reasoning is quite simple to 
apply; it is understandable and strongly rooted in common-
sense. But it does not offer a panacea for the inherent un-
certainties of a dynamic business world. 
The incremental principle discussed in Chapter 1 states 
that a course of action is sound if expected added revenue 
exceeds expected added cost. We believe that estimates of 
such changes in costs and revenues are easy to make, once 
the basic principles are understood. They involve less dif-
ficulty than the estimation of average costs, which requires 
conjectural and arbitrary allocations of overhead. The correct 
application of this principle, however, does require skill in 
evaluating the total situation-in recognizing the appropriate 
opportunity costs and in applying the discounting principle 
when it is relevant. 
DECISION ONE: SIMPLE 
INCREMENTAL ANALYSIS 
Ajax Cleaners is one of several dry cleaning and laundry 
outlets which are owned by a family corporation that main-
tains accounting reports for each of the several branches. 
Mostly, the individual managers are allowed to make their 
own decisions. But at times the president of the corporation 
does make suggestions. 
In June, 1959, wages and salaries of Ajax were 49 percent 
of sales, a condition which violated a 33~ percent limit.l 
Upon noting this, the president advised the manager to dis-
continue the shirt laundry (a minor segment of revenue, dry 
cleaning being the principal service) until November. This 
suggestion was based on the presumed escapability of labor 
cost resulting from cessation of the shirt laundry. The final 
decision was left to the manager; it is his analysis that we 
evaluate. 
The analysis: incremental costs 
The manager did not have accounting information in a 
form needed to resolve the issue. The accounting report re-
ceived from the central office showed only total costs and 
revenues classified in major categories. The manager was 
not furnished with cost and revenue data for purposes 
other than financial reporting; he had to construct his own 
decision-making data. 
1 This rule was accepted by the managements of several laundry 
and dry cleaning firms interviewed during the course of the study. This 
case illustrates the danger of using such ratios in decision making with-
out analyzing the total situation. 
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During the month of July he kept an accurate record 
of costs and revenues which resulted directly from shirt 
laundry business. Two costs were included in the analysis: 
labor and supplies. Both were variable costs; both could be 
avoided when there was no laundry work. Supplies included 
the soap, water, starch, bleach, packaging, etc., required to 
launder a "batch" of shirts. Notice that fixed costs were not 
included-no arbitrary allocations were made. The manager 
was interested only in the incremental cost of laundering 
shirts; fixed costs were not relevant for this particular 
decision. 
At the end of July the manager tabulated incremental 
cost and incremental revenue and compared: 
Incremental revenue . ... .. .. ... ... . . .. . ... . ... $ 740 
Incremental cost . ... .. .. ... .. ..... .. .. . .. .. . . . .. 390 
Net incremental revenue .................... $ 350 
This analysis indicated that if the shirt laundry had been 
abandoned, net profit for July would have been approx-
imately $350 less than the reported $900. That is, the firm 
would have escaped from $390 in cost, but at the same time 
it would have given up $740 in revenue. It is also interesting 
that the recommended course of action would have reduced 
the ratio of salaries to sales by one percentage point, but it 
would have cost the firm $350! 
The incremental analysis convinced the president that 
continuation of the shirt laundry was profitable. 
An alternative analysis: full costs 
Now suppose that incremental analysis had not been 
used. Assume that full costs were calculated and compared 
with revenue thusly:2 
Revenue .............................................. $ 740 
Full cost . . .. ... .. . .. ... .. ... ....... ... . ..... ... ... .... 745 
"Loss" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $ 5 
2 This calculation, prepared by the interviewer, is based on analysis 
of income statements and allocation of overhead according to reason-
able bases. 
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Although the "loss" is insignificant in absolute amount, it 
might have had an influence on the decision. Quite different 
results would have been obtained from using total costs 
rather than incremental costs. 
This full cost analysis not only suggests that inescapable 
fixed costs could be escaped; it also ignores the problem of 
complementarity of demand. Discontinuance of the shirt 
business might have diminished the cleaning revenues. The 
incremental point of view, by stressing estimation of all 
impacts of a decision, is more likely to give attention to 
such additional changes in revenue. 
The decision horizon 
The manager's decision was shortrun in character. The 
laundry was to be suspended only for the summer months-
usually a slow season for this segment. This particular feature 
of the situation enabled the decision maker to concentrate 
on incremental costs without making allowances for other 
factors. 
1. Opportunity costs were negligible. There were no 
alternative uses for the fixed facilities of the laundry. If the 
facilities had been useful for other purposes, it would have 
been important to consider these alternatives. 
2. The longrun impact of the decision was negligible. 
Cessation of the service during the summer months would 
not have materially affected future shirt laundry business, 
at least in the opinion of local management. 
3. The discounting principle was not important because 
of the extremely shortrun implications of the decision. 
Implications for accounting 
Two observations are made concerning the role of ac-
counting in this decision: an accounting report induced the 
decision; but past this step, accounting data were not used. 
Decision making of this sort was not a purpose of the ac-
counting system; the purpose was financial reporting for 
upper echelon control. 
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A decision of this kind has occurred only once and was 
easily handled by a special cost study; yet there is justification 
for programed accounting data. Two services, dry cleaning 
and shirt laundry, are competing for scarce resources which 
must be allocated. Slumping profits and unacceptable in-
come statement item relationships caused the existing al-
location to be questioned; yet it should be useful for the 
firm to analyze the "product mix" continually and to effect 
adjustments in the light of existing conditions. That is, the 
firm could adopt offensive rather than defensive tactics. To 
expedite such decisions, management could be furnished 
with programed data which convey the correct concept of 
relative profitability-contribution of each segment to fixed 
costs. 
Thus, we can detect good reasons for having programed 
data of the sort accumulated by the manager for the special 
study. And there is no reason why both purposes-financial 
reporting and decision making-cannot be served. The data 
could easily have been accumulated and summarized ac-
cording to the format of marginal income analysis. 
A note on marginal income analysis 
In an earlier chapter we introduced the basic concepts 
of marginal income analysis. In the preceding section we 
suggested that the dry cleaning establishment could benefit 
from the method. At no point have we stated how a firm 
might design an accounting system which would develop the 
data systematically. There is literature which indicates how 
this might be done, but it deals with large organizations 
having trained staff members.3 Using as our model the small 
3 See Albert J. Bergfeld, James S. Earley, and William R. Knob-
loch, Pricing for Profit and Growth (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1957); 
Earley, Jour. Pol. Econ., LXIII, 227-42; National Association of Cost 
Accountants, The Analysis of Cost-Profit-Volume Relationships, 
N.A.C.A. Research Report (Reprint of Research Series 16, 17, and 18 
published in the N.A.C.A. Bulletin 1949-50); National Association of 
Accountants, Separating and Using Costs as Fixed and Variable, Ac-
counting Practice Report No. 10, June, 1960, sec. 3. In addition to 
the above, we must recognize and acknowledge the work done by vari-
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cleaning firm, we present here the various steps in the process 
of developing programed marginal income analysis for a 
small business. 
Determination of relevant segments. ·A segment may 
be a product, a product line, or a service. In multiproduct 
firms, each product or product line is a segment, or con-
tributor to the gross revenues of the firm. In our example, 
we shall consider two segments-dry cleaning and shirt 
laundry. 
Segregation of costs between fixed and variable. There 
are three basic means by which costs can be segregated: ( 1) 
analysis of the chart of accounts, ( 2) statistical interpretation 
of past results, and ( 3) engineering studies of cost-volume 
relationships. A recent publication states that statistical 
analysis is the more popular method in large corporations.4 
The small firm might find it expedient to analyze the chart 
of accounts and, under various assumptions of change in 
output of a segment, to estimate the change in individual 
costs. The firm might do as the manager of the firm above 
did: actually observe and record the variable costs incurred 
in a segment. 
There are many woolly questions in cost studies of this 
kind. Probably the greatest problem is segregating fixed from 
variable costs. Few costs are wholly fixed or wholly variable; 
some costs increase discontinuously with the output of a 
segment. But there are certain useful guides for making 
the segregation. 
1. Assigned fixed costs of a segment include only those 
costs which are "fixed" for shortrun operations, but which 
can be avoided if the segment is permanently discontinued. 
Depreciation of special equipment as well as the salaries of 
supervisors or key employees are obvious examples.5 
ous trade associations. The American Institute of Laundering, Joliet, 
Illinois, for example, has encouraged members to recognize the useful-
ness of fixed-variable cost segregation in decision making. 
4 Separating and Using Costs as Fixed and Variable, p. 11. 
5 If there is no market for the equipment, then depreciation cannot 
be avoided. 
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2. Variable costs of a segment include costs that vary 
with output of the segment. Obviously, it is necessary to 
compromise between precision and practicality. In few 
instances will there be a continuous relationship; rather dis-
continuity characterizes the usual relationship between cost 
and output. A special study of costs in each segment can 
reveal the costs which do vary over a relevant range of output. 
3. Unassigned fixed costs include those costs which do 
not vary with the output of a segment and which could not 
be avoided by a permanent retrenchment of any one 
segment. 
Development of a system of accounts. A study has been 
made of the variability of costs in the two segments of the 
dry cleaning and laundry case. On this basis, a chart of 
accounts is established which facilitates reporting to manage-
ment. 
Four major classifications of accounts with various sub-
accounts are needed.6 
Laundry 
1. Sales Revenue 
2. Variable Costs 
(a) Wages 
(b) Supplies 
(c) Heat, light, power 
(d) Employer's payroll 
tax 
(e) Repair and 
maintenance 
(f) Clothes lost and 
repaired 
3. Assigned fixed costs 
(a) Depreciation of 
equipment 
Dry Cleaning 
I. Sales Revenue 
2. Variable Costs 
(a) Wages 
(b) Supplies 
(c) Heat, light, power 
(d) Employer's payroll 
(e) 
(f) 
tax 
Repair and 
maintenance 
Clothes lost and 
repaired 
3. Assigned fixed costs 
(a) Depreciation of 
equipment 
4. Unassigned fixed costs 
(a) Salaries 
(b) Advertising 
6 The discussion from this point on is based on analysis of income 
statements of the firm. We have made a number of assumptions which 
could be checked by a closer study of the firm's operations. 
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(c) Repairs and maintenance of plant 
(d) Taxes 
(e) Telephone 
(f) Heat, light, power 
(g) Employer's payroll tax 
(h) Rent 
( i) Depreciation of building, fixtures 
(i) Amortization of leasehold improvements 
(k) Insurance 
Some salaries and wages, such as the manager's and re-
ceiving clerk's, are fixed and not affected by the output of 
the two segments; others, such as an unskilled pressman's, 
vary with the output. There may be movement of the labor 
force between the two segments; this is not a problem be-
cause of the firm's ability to cut back labor whenever there 
is no work. 
Heat, light, and power costs must be studied to de-
termine the extent to which each can be attributed to the 
two segments. Some of the cost is attributable to neither 
(both segments are under the same roof) and therefore must 
be classified as unassigned fixed cost. 
After the account classification is established, financial 
data are recorded in the usual manner. At regular intervals 
the accounts are summarized and reports prepared, which 
then must be interpreted by management. The last step 
then is to use the reports correctly. 
Interpretation of the reports. Figure 4 illustrates the 
kind of income statement that might have been received by 
the firm for June, 1959, had a marginal income accounting 
system been used. This report would have indicated that it 
would not have been advisable to discontinue the shirt 
laundry. The segment is contributing a positive sum to the 
unassigned cost. On this basis, there is no justification for 
the president's suggested course of action. 
Even if the firm recognizes the importance of demand 
considerations and even if it realizes that incremental analysis 
does not mean prices should be set at incremental costs, 
there are real dangers in any system which depends upon 
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Figure 4. An income statement resulting from a programed marginal income analysis accounting system 
Sales 
Variable cost: 
Wages 
Supplies 
Heat, light, power 
Employer's payroll tax 
!Contribution to assigned 
and unassigned fixed cost 
Depreciation 
Contribution to 
unassigned fixed cost 
Unassigned fixed cost: 
Salaries 
Advertising 
Telephone 
Heat, light, power 
Employer's payroll tax 
Rent 
Depreciation 
Amortization 
Insurance 
Net loss for the period 
Dry Cleaning 
$790 
760 
150 
43 
$2,800 
1,743 
$1,057 
200 
• 851 
t650 
88 
66 
3S 
36 
100 
183 
140 
95 
$170 
136 
25 
9 
Laundry 
$480 
340 
$140 
100 
• 40 • 897 
1,393 
• 496 
relations that change with time. There is an ever-present 
danger that what may have been a variable cost at the time 
the account classification was established has reverted to a 
fixed cost when the time comes to make a decision.7 This 
problem can never be completely eliminated; yet, by con-
tinually examining the classification in terms of what is 
known to be true at the present, corrections can be made. 
A second danger is that the information is not relevant 
for all decisions-as indeed is true of any one source of data. 
But for a great number of functions, e.g., short-term budget-
ing, selective selling, product selection, and pricing, this 
information can be useful. 
In spite of these difficulties, marginal income analysis 
is complementary to incremental analysis: it emphasizes 
changes in cost in response to a controllable factor-output. 
It is not a substitute for the management function but can 
be a valuable adjunct. 
DECISION TWO: COMPLEX 
INCREMENTAL ANALYSIS 
Steven's Tire Company is located in a large metropolitan 
area. In years past, 75 percent of total revenue resulted from 
wholesale orders, and 25 percent resulted from retail sales. 
In 1959, the firm was stimulated to search for ways of in-
creasing profits, which had dropped $15,000 since 1957. 
Immediate action 
To counter the trend of diminishing profits, the firm 
undertook an extensive advertising campaign. The objective 
of the strategy was to increase retail sales of tires. Although 
the bulk of the firm's business was wholesale trade, retail 
sales were more profitable per individual order. There were 
no evident results from the advertising campaign, and the 
firm considered actions with longer range effects. 
7 For example, the variable wage of an unskilled employee may 
become an unavoidable salary as he gains skill as a pressman. If so, his 
payment must be reclassified as an assigned fixed cost. 
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Long-range action 
Three alternatives were considered by the firm when 
the downward trend in profits was not arrested by the im-
mediate action: ( 1) to purchase rental property, ( 2) to 
establish an additional retail outlet, and ( 3) to purchase new 
equipment. Only the first and second alternatives were 
seriously considered; general improvement in technology was 
expected in a few years which would render obsolete any 
equipment purchased at that time. The decision maker 
chose to purchase rental property; the process by which this 
course was selected is of particular interest. 
The firm found a possible site which could be leased for 
$3,000 per annum. An estimate of incremental costs was 
prepared by the interviewer which included the salary of a 
salesman and bookkeeper and other operating expenses. The 
labor force would be supplemented by transferring two men 
from the present shop to the new location; their salaries 
would not be incremental. Additionally, one of the three 
executives would have to devote his full time to the new 
store; this would not involve an added cash expenditure. 
The estimate of incremental net revenues was: 
Expected annual revenue from new 
location ....................................... . 
Less: Incremental cost of goods sold $ 66,000 
Incremental operating expenses 12,5 50 
Net incremental revenue ................ ----'---
$ 88,000 
78,550 
$ 9,450 
The computation indicates that the decision would be quite 
lucrative, especially since the initial investment was only 
$2,000 (office furniture and fixtures, depreciation of which 
was included in the calculation of incremental costs). The 
proposal seems even more appealing when it is recognized 
that the capitalized present value of the investment is about 
$28,000.8 In other words, for $2,000 the firm could purchase 
8 This figure was not calculated by the firm. The five-year discount 
period was chosen because it seems reasonable in terms of the situation. 
The discount rate is likewise an arbitrary choice, although 20 percent 
does allow for the uncertainty involved by heavily discounting revenue 
in the last two years. 
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an asset with a present worth of better than fourteen times 
its cost. Why then was this alternative not chosen? Let us 
look at the analysis of the alternative before answering that 
question. 
The firm had been purchasing property near its present 
location, which was to have provided space for expected ex-
pansion. Yet the expected growth did not materialize and 
the firm found itself in the position of landlord of two 
apartment houses. The opportunity arose during the time 
the retail outlet was being considered to purchase the re-
maining building on the block. The final price quoted and 
accepted was $11,500. The firm estimated that net rental 
income would be approximately $1,900; the building would 
pay out in about six years, well within the ten-year pay-back 
criterion that the firm considered appropriate for rental 
property. 
The firm expected that within ten years this property 
would be sold at an appreciated value; urban redevelopment 
projects were being talked of for this area. On the basis of 
this information, we estimate the present value to be about 
$16,000, well in excess of the cost ($11,500).9 
We do not claim much for the exactness of our present 
value calculations, nor do we intend to make an issue of the 
fact that, according to our estimates, the retail store appears 
to be the more profitable alternative. Let us, instead, 
evaluate the reasons the firm gave for choosing the rental 
property. 
The bases for the choice 
First, regarding the retail outlet, the principal concern 
of the firm was the strain such a move would have on 
management. The executive that the firm would transfer to 
the new store was, in large measure, responsible for servicing 
a number of wholesale accounts. It appeared that the sales 
9 We chose to use a ten-year period and 10 percent discount rate; 
the tenth year includes $12,000 for the sale of the building and $1,900 
for rent. 
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to these accounts would suffer should he transfer. In eco-
nomic terms, there was an opportunity cost involved which 
should be charged to the new store. 
Another opportunity cost was the possibility that with 
the sales executive absent, it might be necessary to hire a 
wholesale sales manager at a salary of $100 per week. This 
contingency, though not quantitatively expressed, carried a 
heavy subjective penalty. 
Secondly, profits were improving during the period of 
the analysis. Thus the objective which the firm had sought 
to attain was satisfied; there was no longer reason to under-
take drastic measures. 
One can understand why the firm might choose the 
rental property in lieu of the retail outlet. We do not have 
a clear explanation as to why both proposals were not ac-
cepted; present value, it is safe to say, exceeded the cost of 
both investment proposals. The fact is that management did 
not give full attention to the retail store opportunity and let 
it go by default. 
Evaluation 
The management of Steven's Tire Company did not 
completely analyze the retail store alternative; therefore, it 
is difficult to evaluate the decision-making processes. But 
we have indicated that incremental analysis would have 
focused attention on the relevant variables. The opportunity 
costs were difficult to measure and the demand for manage-
ment's attention to routine matters did not encourage more 
serious attention to their measurement. Thus it appears that 
the complexities of the decision accompanied by the dearth 
of management time to unravel the complexities prevented 
full exploitation of the situation. 
In conclusion, incremental analysis would have been ap-
propriate for this decision problem, but this does not mean 
that the whole analysis could have been quantified. In fact, 
we have indicated that subjective evaluations of opportunity 
costs would have been required. 
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The decision and its implications for accounting 
This discussion has indicated the failure of accounting 
to provide information on the relevant costs of a decision. 
We are in no position, however, to criticize the accounting 
system on this score; its obvious purpose in the organization 
was for financial reporting and, in some respects, cost con-
trol. It is doubtful that any form of accounting data would 
produce the correct cost figures for decisions of the type 
confronted by Steven's Tire Company. The case study 
demonstrates the limitations of any programed approach, in-
cluding marginal income analysis; programed methods are 
incapable of taking into account the special circumstances 
of all available alternatives. 
SELECTED CASE STUDIES 
The following brief cases compare actual analysis with in-
cremental analysis and also show the bearing which account-
ing data have or might have to the situation. 
1. A decision to purchase a truck for daily 
service to supermarket wine departments 
Actual analysis. A subjective analysis was made by a 
wine distributor comparing the additional costs of operating 
a truck with the additional revenues resulting from the better 
service. Overhead was not allocated to this new "source" of 
revenue, nor was the cost of the driver included-he was 
already on the payroll and would be transferred to the new 
job. His former duties could be handled by other employees. 
Incremental analysis. Not much can be added to the 
actual analysis except to note that implicit interest was not 
charged to the truck. Even though internal funds were used 
to purchase the truck, interest should have been included 
to give recognition to opportunity costs. This would have 
in no way affected the outcome of the decision, since the 
amount of money involved was not material. 
Implications for accounting. Accounting data could 
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have been used in this decision only to indicate the whole-
sale cost of additional wine. Other costs had to be esti-
mated or secured from other sources. 
2. A decision to sell a standard product at a reduced price 
Actual analysis. A clay refractory received an offer from 
a distant customer to take a product during the off season at 
a reduced price. The firm accepted the offer, since the ad-
ditional revenue from this contract would greatly exceed the 
incremental cost of the product. The firm did not allocate 
overhead for this decision; rather it considered only the 
added cost required to produce the desired quantity-variable 
costs. 
It was recognized that this price concession would in no 
way affect other business, and there was no indication of 
possible, more lucrative, offers. 
Incremental analysis. This case is a straightforward ex-
ample of the application of incremental analysis. Indeed, it 
seems so elementary that one might question its inclusion. 
Yet the following case (No. 3) is parallel in every respect 
except that a different course of action was taken. 
Implications for accounting. The firm had to estimate 
the incremental cost of this product. The accounting system 
developed only total costs, from which average costs were 
estimated. Variable costing would have given the firm an 
indication of the relevant cost for this decision. 
3. A decision to sell a standard service at a reduced price 
Actual analysis. A laundry establishment regularly bid 
on special business (motel and hotel contracts for "flat 
work") during the summer months in order to fill excess 
capacity. Yet in formulating the bid, the firm would never 
go below "full cost." This extra off-season business would in 
no way affect future business and there was no more profit-
able use of the idle capacity; the firm consistently lost these 
contracts by refusing to bid below full cost. 
Incremental analysis. In view of the circumstances, the 
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only cost that was relevant for this decision was the ad-
ditional cost of doing the business. Overhead was an ir-
relevant cost. If a bid was accepted which covered the in-
cremental cost of the business and made some contribution 
to overhead, it would have been profitable. Yet management 
desired that all business cover full cost-and profits probably 
suffered as a result of the policy. 
Implications for accounting. While managers cannot 
be expected to use cost data which they consider "wrong," 
sound handling of this decision would have considered the 
kind of data developed by marginal income analysis. 
4. A decision to sell home-cooked foods 
on a percentage of sales arrangement 
Actual analysis. The firm, a small gift shop, considered 
only the revenues that might result from the sale of the 
food. There was no merchandise cost, and the producers 
took back all leftovers. No overhead was allocated. The ad-
ditional sales of other items that might result from handling 
food were considered important. No doubt customers were 
attracted who would have gone elsewhere to buy the gifts 
and dry goods sold by this store. The management recog-
nized that no additional sales force was required to handle 
these foods. 
Incremental analysis. The analysis of this firm pro-
ceeded correctly, except that the opportunity cost of alter-
native use of the shelf space was not formally considered. 
Although this case is seemingly rather simple, we might 
mention that a similar firm discontinued the product because 
it was suspected of not paying for its overhead. 
Implications for accounting. It is doubtful that any kind 
of accounting data would help in this kind of decision, ex-
cept to report sales of the item to enable periodic comparison 
with alternatives. The estimation of the impact of home-
cooked food on other sales was necessarily subjective; ac-
counting would have had nothing to contribute to such an 
analysis. 
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5. A decision to buy a component part of a 
finished product instead of making it 
Actual analysis. The analysis of this manufacturer pro-
ceeded by comparing the variable cost of making the part 
with the purchase price (including estimated costs of re-
ceiving and stocking the part) . Yet the analysis ceased to be 
incremental when the firm reallocated the overhead to other 
processes; higher unit costs resulted which indicated that 
higher prices would have to be charged on other finished 
products. On these grounds, the decision was to continue 
making the part. 
Incremental analysis. Had the firm considered escapable 
costs to be the only relevant cost concept, it might not have 
handled the problem in the way that it did. As long as the 
cost of buying from an outside supplier exceeded the escap-
able costs, it was advantageous to make the part rather than 
to buy it. The reallocation of overhead was unnecessary and 
irrelevant. 
Implications for accounting. The results of this decision 
indicate clearly the danger of wrongly using overhead al-
locations. Incidents such as these present strong arguments 
in favor of direct costing, although this would do no good 
unless management accepts the validity of incremental con-
cepts. 
6. A decision to install an inventory of men's suits to replace 
a "made to measure" arrangement with a distant factory 
Actual analysis. A small men's shop had a "made to 
measure" arrangement requiring no inventory of suits; 
customers were measured and specifications sent to the 
factory, which made the suits accordingly. On these sales 
the firm received 45 percent of the selling price. A supplier 
offered the firm a line of suits with a national reputation, but 
at a 35 percent gross profit. The proposal was rejected on 
two grounds: the required inventory investment and the 
lower markup. No real evaluation was made of opportunity 
costs. 
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Incremental analysis. Other factors should have been 
considered in the decision. Incremental revenues should in-
clude estimates of total revenue from the sale of suits and 
other items which might be sold because of complementary 
demand. From these revenues, estimated incremental costs 
would be subtracted: ( 1) lost revenue from abandonment 
of "made to measure" suits; ( 2) additional costs incurred 
because of the new suits, including handling, advertising, 
interest on inventory investment, cost of merchandise, etc., 
but no overhead; ( 3) estimated profits from alternative uses 
of the funds (although the interest charge may be sufficient 
for this purpose) . 
Of course these estimates would be highly conjectural 
and may not have changed the decision; the point is the 
actual analysis did not consider all the relevant costs. 
Implications for accounting. Accounting data could not 
possibly have indicated the opportunity costs involved in 
this decision. The concepts of merchandise management ac-
counting could have been used, although it is doubtful 
whether a firm of this size could afford to develop more 
refined data. 
7. A decision on the price of two products, the demand 
for which appears insensitive to price increases 
Actual analysis. This firm, a small machine shop and 
metals warehouse, has a price policy which considers a 100 
percent markup on cost to be appropriate. The firm is the 
sole supplier of bronze and stainless steel in the area and 
there is every indication that the firm could charge higher 
prices without a loss of business. The cost-plus formula does 
not permit demand-orientated pricing. 
Incremental analysis. If we assume that the firm wishes 
to maximize profits, then we should expect that it would 
raise price to garner the additional revenue. This would be 
the approach of incremental analysis. Other cases may have 
left the reader with an idea that incremental analysis always 
means a low price policy, but this is not true. Rather, de-
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mand is always a consideration, especially the concept of 
elasticity of demand. 
Implications for accounting. Accounting data can tell 
little about elasticity of demand. Some indication of future 
demand might be obtained from past records if the firm has 
experimented with price in the past; but when this has not 
been the case, the decision must rest on other sources of 
data. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Undoubtedly the principal deterrent of the more general use 
of incremental analysis is a concept of cost, fostered to some 
extent by accounting, which managers believe absolute and, 
consequently, applicable to all decisions. A British account-
ant, D. R. C. Halford, writing recently, disproves the validity 
of "the" cost for decision making, and our case studies bear 
out his conclusion.1° For the decision maker, cost and 
revenue must be considered within a flexible framework and 
properly balanced only after a careful weighing of many 
factors. 
This criticism of the programed system built around full 
costs should not be taken as criticism of any programed data, 
nor even of the concept of full cost itself; rather it is directed 
at the blind acceptance of data. Incremental analysis may 
make use of programed data, but only if data are accumu-
lated by cause. And the emphasis of incremental methods is 
not so much on the accumulation of data as upon use and 
meaning. 
What incremental analysis demonstrates and what the 
case studies of this chapter support is the need for flexibility 
of cost analyses, with adaptation of cost measurements to 
particular problems. Therefore, many small firms may profit 
from learning about incremental reasoning in general, with 
a resultant improvement in their ad hoc decision making. It 
to D. R. C. Halford, Differential Costs and Management Decisions 
(London: Sir Isaac Pitman and Sons, Ltd., 1959), p. 2. 
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is impossible to say generally when programed incremental 
analysis is justified. It is possible, however, to state that 
incremental reasoning, whether programed or nonprogramed, 
whether subjective or empirical, is necessary for sound 
decision making. 
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AN OVERVIEW OF INVESTMENT 
AND PRICING DECISIONS 
~E CENTRAL purpose of this study is to evaluate the 
role of accounting in the decisions of small firms. We do 
not concentrate on particular kinds of decisions; rather, we 
examine a number of different types within the context of 
particular industries. In this chapter, however, we emphasize 
two particularly crucial matters in small firms-investment 
and pricing decisions. 
This chapter serves two purposes. One is to bring to-
gether in one place the analysis of investment and pricing 
decisions, which up to this point has been scattered over a 
series of chapters.1 The second is to formulate general con-
clusions on the import of accounting data in these decisions. 
INVESTMENT DECISIONS OF SMALL FIRMS 
Investment decisions are highly diverse, but they all have 
two qualities in common: the outlay of funds for new assets 
and the hope for a return.2 The focal point is the relation-
ship between present expenditures and future receipts. The 
decision maker must estimate whether profits will result in 
amounts adequate to justify the expenditure. But this is 
only one step in the process of investment decisions. Ef-
fective capital budgeting requires a search for opportunities 
and a search for information. It entails a forecast of avail-
able funds and of the cost of these funds. It implies a 
rationing of funds to alternatives ranked according to some 
criterion. It involves a follow-up of previous investments to 
help evaluate past performance and to improve future de-
cisions. It is not surprising that accounting plays a limited 
role in investment decisions, for accounting normally provides 
no information on future receipts or on the availability and 
cost of funds. Accounting might provide incremental cost 
and follow-up data. The question is the extent to which the 
accounting systems of small firms actually provide such data. 
Quantitative methods for ranking 
Quantitative methods attempt to substitute objective 
criteria for the more nebulous subjective evaluation of the 
decision maker. They cannot completely eliminate personal 
judgment. 
Discounted rate of return or present value. These 
methods are widely accepted as theoretically correct. They 
1 For full analyses, see Martin B. Solomon, Jr., Investment De-
cisions in Small Business (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 
1963); W. Warren Haynes, Pricing Decisions in Small Business (Lex-
ington: University of Kentucky Press, 1962). 
2 Ronello B. Lewis, "The Role of Accounting in Decision-Making," 
Accounting Review, XXXV (Jan., 1960), 37. 
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both involve mathematical techniques based on the dis-
counting principle. Any alternative methods which do not 
include discounting must be considered as approximations 
to the true rate of return. 
There are difficulties in the practical application of these 
methods. There is, for example, the problem not only of 
forecasting the inflows over the length of life of the asset, 
but also of determining the actual life. Inherent in both is 
the problem of uncertainty. On the practical level, in view 
of the uncertain estimates of future data how much precision 
is lost by using alternative methods? These optional methods 
are discussed below. 
Payback period. This method does not calculate a re-
turn on investment, although this characteristic is not always 
recognized in the literature.3 The payback period measures 
only the length of time required for the proposal to return 
the initial outlay. The calculation is relatively simple: total 
investment divided by the estimated annual net profit. We 
see immediately that this method ignores how long the re-
turns will be earned on the investment. It is certainly pos-
sible to think of situations in which the payback period is 
shorter for A than B, yet B may be more profitable because 
of the longer period of time in which profits accrue. On the 
other hand, it may be quite reasonable for some firms to 
demand a quick return of investment due to stringency of 
funds or great uncertainty about the future. Thus it appears 
that the use of payback period calculations could result in 
decisions quite different from those based on the discounted 
rate of return. 
Payback reciprocal. The inverse of the payback period 
is the payback reciprocal. For projects with a length of life 
considerably beyond the payback period, this method may 
give a good approximation of the discounted rate of return.4 
3 See James H. Miller, "A Glimpse at Practice in Calculating and 
Using Return on Investment," N.A.A. Bulletin, XLI (June, 1960), 65. 
4 Myron J. Gordon, "The Payoff Period and the Rate of Return," 
Journal of Business, XXVIII (Oct., 1955), 253-60. 
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But when the length of life is not much greater, the payback 
reciprocal is an overstatement. It is possible to determine 
the true rate of return quickly from the payback reciprocal 
by special tables.5 Decisions made on the basis of the pay-
back reciprocal alone, however, run the risk of error. 
Rate of income on investment. This method, sometimes 
called the financial statement method, relates the expected 
revenue of an asset to the cost of that asset without regard 
to the discounted values or to the fact that revenues may 
vary from year to year. The first year net income is usually 
given as a percentage of either the initial investment or the 
average investment. The accuracy in estimating rates of re-
turn is somewhat limited in that it depends on the length of 
life of the investment. But for the practical problem of 
ranking alternatives, the method does an admirable job.6 
Method of analysis employed by some small firms 
Of the four quantitative methods, the rate of income on 
investment is best known to accountants. However, they 
have shown a growing interest in the other three. In the 
actual case studies covered by this study, the payback method 
was the only quantitative method used, aside from one firm 
which computed the rate of income on investment. These 
small firms paid little attention to the refinements of quan-
titative analysis. 
A prime consideration in most cases was the require-
ment that the investment pay out in a short time. Firms 
did not usually compute the payback period but apparently 
operated on the principle that investments paying off rapidly 
were more likely to be profitable. 
The rationale for payback and rate of income 
We have seen that most small firms do not bother with 
5 For example, see National Association of Accountants, Return 
on Investment as a Guide to Managerial Decisions, N.A.A. Research 
Report No. 35, Dec., 1959, p. 77. 
6 See Solomon. 
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the refinements of the discounted rate of return or present 
value. Would they be better off to do so? It is unlikely that 
such refinements would produce benefits that exceed the 
added costs in terms of management time and training. The 
case studies suggest degrees of uncertainty and errors in 
estimates that would overshadow the significance of any 
refinements. Even under conditions of certainty the rate of 
income ranks very well when compared with the discounted 
rate of return and present value. Under conditions of un-
certainty, when errors of estimate are likely, the rate of in-
come probably produces results insignificantly different from 
more refined methods. 
Managers probably find it difficult to apply the dis-
counted rate of return in actual investment decisions. If the 
above argument is correct, the rate of income is justified. 
The argument for a short payback period raises similar 
doubts about refinements. Under conditions of financial 
stringency there is a strong motivation for rapid returns. 
Also under conditions of great uncertainty it is understand-
able that stress be placed on the first few years' performance. 
Short-lived investments provide flexibility, and flexibility is 
a major objective under uncertain conditions. 
The real deficiency of small firms in capital budgeting 
is not in the area of ranking and choosing. Small firms as 
represented by this study, with some exceptions, do an ad-
mirable job of choosing profitable alternatives. But there is 
every reason to state that the owners and managers of these 
same firms might well engage in more intensive search ac-
tivity, more creative thinking. The small businessman, how-
ever, must perform various functions-planning, production 
scheduling, selling, labor relations, public relations, account-
ing, etc.-leaving little time for the necessary ingredient of 
adequate capital budgeting-search. The issue resolves itself 
into a weighing of cost and revenue. Can the manager reap 
greater profits by delegating responsibility for routine tasks 
and thus releasing more time for search activity? Obviously, 
this issue must be resolved by each small businessman. 
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Implications for accounting 
A survey of accounting literature quickly reveals that 
some accountants have accepted as valid the discounted rate 
of return and present value analysis. A current research 
report by the National Association of Accountants indicates 
strongly that discounted rate of return is more useful and 
accurate than the financial statement method (rate of in-
come on investment).7 The report cites Dean on the prac-
ticality of the discounted rate of return: "Because the ap-
proach is new in this application (capital budgeting) its use 
requires persuasion and education. Moreover, it initially 
appears to be complex. But this appearance is deceptive; 
once the basic method is understood it is actually simpler 
and quicker to use than the levelbook method."8 Other 
accountants accept the theoretical soundness of the method 
but question its universal practicality. Bierman, for example, 
says: "It was once hoped that the present value or rate of 
return techniques would offer simple solutions to the prob-
lem of making capital investment decisions. It is now ob-
vious that these decisions are complex and that there is no 
one, simple, and correct answer to be obtained."9 There are 
others who argue that the rate of income on investment is 
preferable to the discounted rate of return from the stand-
point of simplicity. This opinion is well illustrated by Lewis' 
statement: "Nothing could be simpler than the easy formula 
of book net profit divided by gross investment to produce 
rate of return."10 
On the basis of the case studies, we recognize that the 
uncertainty inherent in most estimates of future revenues 
and lengths of life limits the validity of any ranking process 
based on rate of return or present value analysis. Therefore, 
7 Return on Investment as a Guide to Managerial Decisions. 
8 Joel Dean, "Profitability Indexes for Capital Investments," Con-
troller, XXXVI (Feb., 1958), 67; quoted in N.A.A. Research Report 
35, Dec., 1959, p. 73. 
9 Harold Bierman, Jr., Managerial Accounting: An Introduction 
(New York: Macmillan Co., 1959), p. 435. 
1o Lewis, Acctg. Rev., XXXV, 41. 
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the effort required to develop these analyses is not usually 
justified.11 
Investment decisions require much more information 
than is divulged by accounting records. Recorded costs are, 
at best, only an imperfect approximation of costs required 
for investment decisions; it is necessary to analyze account-
ing data to determine which are relevant. Small firms must 
accept the fact that investment decisions require data on 
future revenues and expenses, costs of capital, and rates of 
obsolesence, none of which may be supplied from accounting 
records. 
PRICING DECISIONS OF SMALL FIRMS 
In the discussion of pricing decisions,l2 the central issues 
are the extent to which small firms refer to full costs, In-
cremental analysis, and accounting data. 
Cost-plus formulas and pricing decisions 
That some small firms use cost-plus formulas in making 
pricing decisions should be no surprise to those who have 
read other empirical studies on pricing.tS This pricing policy 
is followed for many reasons: a sense of "fairness," ignorance 
of demand conditions, uncertainty of competitors' reactions, 
assumed low elasticities of demand for price decreases, and 
the administrative difficulties involved in more flexible price 
policies. Some firms examined in this study appear to be 
especially concerned with the effect of pricing on customer 
goodwill and longrun volume. However, the majority of 
small firms do not apply full-cost formulas mechanically; 
they generally relate their prices to demand as well as costs. 
Thus our findings do not support the conclusions in some 
11 For a fuller development of this argument see Solomon, esp. 
chap. 6. 
12 Haynes. 
13 Robert L. Hall and Charles J. Hitch, Price Theory and Business 
Behavior, Oxford Economic Papers No. 2, May, 1939, pp. 12, 18-22, 
25-27, 29-33. 
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previous studies that suggest a rigid adherence to predeter-
mined markups on costs. 
In many cases, the profit markup varies according to 
the firms' best estimates of demand. That is, the markup 
is maintained by the firm only so long as demand allows. 
In other cases the firms actually reduce their estimates of 
full cost if, when the markup is applied, the resultant price 
proves unacceptable in the market. It is most important to 
recognize that cost-plus pricing is a multistep process in 
which the initial planned markup may be adjusted through 
time and tailored to the individual products. 
Most small businesses are multiproduct firms and sell 
their products under diverse market conditions. In some 
markets and for some products they may have a strong 
monopoly position; in others, they may face close compe-
tition. The evidence shows that these firms adjust prices to 
the varied conditions rather than follow mechanical pricing 
rules, thereby demonstrating cross-sectional flexibility on in-
dividual products as well as flexibility over time. 
Some firms regard full cost as a level below which prices 
should not fall. They take this stand as a result of con-
siderations of market stability, of customer relations, and of 
competition. Sometimes they may take it simply because 
management has failed to recognize a variety of cost con-
cepts, expecting each product to return its share of profits. 
The policy of "full cost floors" is, in some measure, a com-
promise accepted by small firms in recognition of the re-
straints imposed upon them by their size and their closer 
relationship with their customers. 
Full costs are used in some instances in a manner con-
trary to the economists' prescription for pricing. There are 
several firms, especially in the printing industry, which 
staunchly support the notion that every product should bear 
its share of overhead. We have discussed already the case 
of a laundry which refused to take a profitable special order 
at less than full cost. We have also discussed a clay re-
fractory which did recognize the commonsense of accepting 
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a special bid at less than full cost but at more than variable 
cost. But it is impossible to state generally that small firms 
either reject or accept marginal reasoning. 
To be complete, some mention should be made of firms 
that avoid pricing decisions. Some firms simply imitate the 
prices of others. Some follow the suggestions of manufac-
turers or wholesalers. This is not necessarily contradictory 
to incremental reasoning; the manufacturers' suggestions 
probably reflect attention to market forces. There is strong 
reason for believing that suggested markups recognize dif-
fering demand elasticities on various products.14 
Pricing decisions in many firms are indicative of the 
ultimate aims of management. A desire for adequate or 
satisfactory profits is evidenced by the failure of many firms 
to change prices until they become dissatisfied with the re-
sults shown on their income statements. Some firms are not 
engaged in a constant struggle for maximum profits. Other 
firms consider maximum profits to be the proper goal. Some 
firms experiment with price, recognize elasticities of demand, 
and capitalize on cost-profit-volume analysis. 
In those firms which stress full costs in pricing, account-
ing takes on a great significance. Accounting systems provide 
estimates of full costs. But as we have seen, full cost esti-
mates are not so important in pricing decisions as they first 
appear. 
One basic conclusion of incremental analysis for pricing 
is that there are two determinants of price-cost and demand. 
Practical application of this idea is often hampered by scarce 
information on demand. The firm has, from experience, 
some notion of what customers have paid in the past, but 
this serves as only an approximation of what they would be 
willing and able to pay in the future. 
Incremental analysis considers the response of costs to 
14 Two other pricing methods-"gross margin" pricing, and pric-
ing when cost, because of its nebulous character, has little influence-
have been discussed. Examples of these instances have been evaluated 
in earlier chapters and need not be repeated. 
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changes in volume. For establishing selling prices, only 
those costs which change with output are relevant: the firm 
must have variable cost information. The obvious source of 
such data is the accounting system. But all too often the 
cost system does not divulge variable cost data explicitly. 
Rather, the firm must sift through the accounts and antici-
pate which costs are pertinent. Here the small firm is in a 
better position than the large firm because management is 
close enough to operations to estimate the variable costs. 
A consequence of incremental analysis is that every 
product is not required to recover its full cost. This idea has 
long been recognized in retailing, where we find "loss leaders" 
and "close out" sales. In other industries this conclusion has 
not been accepted-thus there may be adherence to "full 
cost." 
It should be repeated that incremental reasoning does 
not imply low prices. What it does imply is adjustment of 
prices to both demand and cost influences. A firm that takes 
advantage of inelastic demand by raising prices far above 
costs is behaving consistently with incremental reasoning. 
It is not suggested that all firms can profit from close 
attention to pricing. Some of them are probably quite right 
in concentrating on other types of decisions: advertising, 
sales promotion, inventory control, product mix, and so on. 
What is important is that small businesses not fall short of 
optimum pricing because of failure to recognize the correct 
concepts. 
Implications for accounting 
A leading accountant suggests that cost accounting may 
sometimes bolster management's tendency to price on the 
basis of full costs.15 The distribution of overhead may be 
accepted as a reflection of the relative usage of scarce factors 
of production, without recognition of differences in contri-
bution to profit. 
15 Devine, Acctg. Rev., XXV, 384·9. Reprinted in Thomas, pp. 
333-41. 
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On the other hand, an economist, James S. Earley, 
argues that cost accounting has actually had a positive in-
fluence in winning acceptance of incremental reasoning: His 
study finds that "leading cost accountants and management 
consultants are currently advocating principles of accounting 
analysis and decision-making that are essentially 'marginalist' 
in character and implications."16 
It is difficult to determine, therefore, whether account-
ing has had a positive or negative influence on adoption of 
incremental reasoning in pricing. In this study of small firm 
decisions there has been evidence both of confusion resulting 
from overhead allocations and of fairly sophisticated use of 
accounting data. Probably cost accountants are responsible 
for neither, since few small firms can afford their services. 
If small businessmen make correct or incorrect use of ac-
counting, it is usually a result of their own training and 
volition. 
A central issue throughout this volume has been the 
profitability of programed accounting methods in small bus-
iness pricing decisions. Generally, we have been skeptical 
of the value of programed incremental data, mainly because 
small businesses do not have sufficient occasion to use such 
data. Management is close enough to the situation to make 
special studies of costs and volume with little effort. Unless 
management understands the assumptions involved in mar-
ginal accounting, it is likely to misapply the results. We 
have cited cases in which marginal income data would have 
been useful; it would be desirable if some firms experimented 
with these new accounting methods. However, as a general 
statement, ad hoc analysis is probably more suitable in most 
small firms, provided management accepts the underlying 
reasoning. 
to James S. Earley, "Marginal Policies of 'Excellently Managed' 
Companies," American Economic Review, XLVI (March, 1956), 44. 
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CONCLUSION 
AccoUNTING is one of the greatest factors in moti-
vating management to initiate the decision-making process. 
Managers commonly have predetermined notions of what 
constitutes satisfactory accounting results, and if they are 
dissatisfied with current results, they exhibit a homeostatic 
tendency to search for improvements. The income statement 
is particularly important in this respect; if the net income 
figure falls short of aspirations, new alternatives are sought. 
Accounting ratios and standards also enable businessmen to 
compare actual results with those in other firms or with 
established norms. Many of our cases illustrate the homeo-
static role of these ratios and standards. 
To turn from description to evaluation, there can be 
no doubt of the value of accounting in calling attention to 
deficiencies in the present state of affairs and in motivating 
management to devote attention to the major issues. A few 
cases exist in which the accounts deflect attention from the 
real issues, but in the main the accounts serve a constructive 
control function. If a need exists in this area, it is to improve 
the design of accounting systems so as to focus attention on 
the significant deviations from standards. 
THE ASSEMBLY AND ANALYSIS 
OF RELEVANT INFORMATION 
The present study is primarily concerned with the way in 
which accounting can and does assemble the kinds of data 
needed for decisions and the way it organizes the variables 
required by the logic of decision making. Before we can 
evaluate the role of accounting in this phase, we must first 
review the nature of rational choice. 
Rational decision-making models 
Earlier chapters present models that indicate the kinds 
of data required for rational decisions. These models in-
corporate the principles of managerial economics outlined in 
Chapter 1-the incremental principle, the time perspective 
principle, the discounting principle, and the opportunity 
cost principle. They involve much more: consideration of 
demand elasticities and of market structures; evaluation of 
the impact of decisions on customer goodwill and on the 
company "image"; and dozens of factors specific to each 
problem. A complete mathematical application of such 
models to business decisions would require that management 
discover the exact quantitative nature of key relationships: 
of volume to price, of cost to product mix, of sales today to 
sales in the future, of the cost of capital, and so on. 
It is quite clear that small businessmen cannot obtain 
the exact quantities needed by such a model; it is even im-
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possible to think simultaneously of all the relationships in-
volved in such a model (and the model is itself a simplifica-
tion). Small businessmen must focus attention on those 
variables that appear to be most relevant. In the language 
of modern management literature, they must "suboptimize" 
because it costs too much time and effort to "optimize." 
In the world of uncertainty the accountant prefers to 
record the known past and thus avoids the risks of prog-
nostication. Businessmen quite understandably often devote 
attention to certain but irrelevant data from the past instead 
of relevant but conjectural estimates for the future. They 
have a tendency to use the information at hand, and ac-
counting information is especially accessible. Thus business-
men make use of full-cost data, partly because such data 
give a feeling of solidity, partly because they are the result 
of widely accepted convention, and partly because they divert 
attention from the need to look into the complexities of the 
future. 
This tendency to select the known rather than the un-
known is not in itself unsound. The uncertainty about the 
effects of decisions is often so great as to negate the value 
of refined techniques. The important need is not so much 
the refined analysis of the alternatives that are known as it 
is an imaginative search for new and superior alternatives. 
Neither accounting nor theoretical model building can help 
the businessman in this search. 
Accounting and decision-nulking models 
Accounting at best involves a compromise with the re-
finements of economic theory and management science. 
The question then becomes whether the accounting pro-
cedures presently used by small firms are the right kind of 
compromise. 
There are some situations in which programed account-
ing methods provide what appears to be a reasonable adap-
tation to the problem. The reliance on full costs for pricing 
in oligopolistic markets may contribute to maintaining cus-
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tomer goodwill and avoiding competitive retaliation. The 
methods most commonly used by accountants for evalu-
ating investments (sometimes known as the "accountant's 
method") do about as well as refined methods in ranking 
investment opportunities in a world of uncertainty.1 Data 
produced as a byproduct of financial or cost accounting are 
inexpensive and are available at regular intervals; they thus 
provide a convenient starting point for many decisions. 
The fact remains that accounting is concerned with the 
past rather than the future. The question is whether past 
data can aid in the prediction of future variables and re-
lationships. An outstanding work on decision making sug-
gests that there are five kinds of prediction-persistence pre-
diction, when stable characteristics of the data maintain a 
close relationship between the past and the future; trajectory 
prediction, when past trends promise to persist in the future; 
cyclic prediction, when past patterns repeat themselves; 
associative prediction, when there are persistent correlations 
among variables; and analogue prediction, when a simplified 
model (mathematical or not) maintains a consistent relation 
to the real world.2 Accounting systems can supply raw ma-
terials for all of these kinds of prediction. But accounting 
cannot indicate when the necessary stabilities in the data 
exist; this is a problem for managerial judgment or for 
statistical analysis. 
As we have seen in some case studies, traditional ac-
counting may at times confuse rather than clarify decision 
making by focusing attention on the wrong data. The out-
standing example is in the measurement of full costs. Full 
costs do not measure the change in costs occasioned by a 
decision, for they include elements that are not affected by 
decisions. Economists have long noted the divergence be-
tween the accountant's depreciation expense and "economic 
1 The reasoning and empirical evidence underlying this generaliza-
tion are developed in Solomon. 
2 Irwin J. Bross, Design for Decision (New York: Macmillan, 
1953), pp. 34-8. 
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depreciation." This is a further illustration of a "cost" that 
may not be relevant for a particular problem. 
We suggest that small businessmen have three choices 
if they wish to improve their decision making: ( 1) they can 
attempt to apply modern quantitative techniques such as 
linear programing and other refined mathematical models 
(accounting can supply data for these models); ( 2) they can 
supplement regular accounting with special forms of in-
cremental accounting; or ( 3) they can improve ad hoc tech-
niques for dealing with decision making. The first is not 
feasible for most small firms because of the expense and the 
special skills required. The others have possibilities worth 
further comment. 
Special forms of incremental accounting 
Earlier chapters indicate developments in accounting 
that move in the direction suggested by the incremental 
principle. These developments go under various names-
direct costing, marginal income analysis, cost-profit-volume 
analysis, differential cost analysis, merchandise management 
accounting, and so on. Some small firms might profit from 
adopting relatively inexpensive forms of marginal income 
analysis that do not require extensive changes in the tra-
ditional accounts; they merely require special statements 
that reorganize the data already supplied in the accounts. 
Marginal income analysis has limitations noted in 
earlier chapters. It does not meet the need for flexible, 
"tailor-made" costs. No programed data collection system 
can provide exactly the kinds of information required for 
all decisions. Furthermore, marginal income analysis has no 
use in firms in which management does not accept the in-
cremental logic on which it is built. Nevertheless, one of our 
major recommendations is for more extensive experimenta-
tion with incremental accounting techniques. 
Improvement of ad hoc analyses 
Small business decision making must continue to rely 
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heavily on nonprogramed analyses which are adapted to the 
problem at hand. One need in this area is for more syste-
matic analyses. Many managers devote too little attention 
to the search for new alternatives and for information about 
alternatives. Many would benefit from merely organizing 
their thoughts on paper. Attempts at partial quantification 
are likely to clarify thought processes, even when it is im-
possible to measure all the variables. 
Many firms would profit from greater attention to ex-
ternal sources of information that could be used in their 
ad hoc analyses. Some might experiment with inexpensive 
forms of market research; one firm in our study is about to 
engage in research that should be helpful in locating new 
markets and in tapping old markets more effectively; the 
total expense of this project should not exceed $1,500. In 
addition, there are numerous published sources of data and 
ideas that most small firms do not exploit to the fullest (ex-
amples are cited in Chapter 1). 
Throughout this volume we have stressed the impor-
tance of a few economic principles relevant to business de-
cisions. We believe that an understanding of these princi-
ples, which are little more than a refinement of common-
sense, can make a significant contribution to logical ad hoc 
analyses. With the aid of these principles, managers can 
make adjustments in accounting data to arrive at estimates 
that have meaning to the particular problem. They can 
separate the costs that are fixed from those that are incre-
mental; they can combine these cost estimates with what-
ever demand estimates and discounting rates seem ap-
propriate. 
We thus stress several requirements for improved small 
business decisions-better education in the meaning of the 
data supplied by the present accounting systems, improved 
skills in adapting these data to individual decision-making 
problems, greater attention to the relations between past 
and future data, recognition of the nonaccounting variables 
that must be combined with accounting estimates to permit 
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complete analyses, and a fuller recognition of the funda-
mental economic concepts that are needed for the correct 
interpretation of the various types of information that are 
available. There are no mechanical devices or formulas to 
replace the businessman's own skills in adapting accounting 
data to his individual problems. 
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